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THE FABLE OF THE CODES: THE
EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMON LAW,
LEGAL ORIGINS, AND
CODIFICATION MOVEMENTS*
Nuno Garoupa**
Andrew P. Morriss***
The superior efficiency of the common law has long been a
staple of the law and economics literature. Generalizing from this
claim, the legal origins literature uses cross-country empirical research in an attempt to demonstrate this superiority by examining
economic growth rates and the presence of common-law legal systems. We argue that this literaturefails to adequately characterizethe
relevant legal variables and that its relianceon broad-brushlabels like
"common law" and "civil law" is inappropriate.
In this Article, we first examine the efficiency literature's claims
about the common law and find that it fails to accurately accountfor
important distinctions across common-law legal systems and underspecifies key terms. We next turn to the lengthy debate that took place
during the nineteenth century in the United States concerning replacing the common law with a civil code, focusing on the debate's focus
on promoting efficient outcomes. We conclude that a focus on legal
systems' ability to cheaply identify efficient rules, restrainrent-seeking
in the formulation and application of rules, adapt rules to changed
conditions, reveal the law to those affected by it, and enable contracting around inefficient rules would be more appropriatethan the current emphasis on labels. Further, more attention to transition costs
would make efforts at reform more credible.
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INTRODUCTION

Building on Judge Richard Posner's 1972 claim in the first edition of
Economic Analysis of Law,' law and economics scholars created an ex-

tensive literature arguing that the common law creates economically effi-

cient rules 2 while statutes are the source of economically inefficient
rules.' If these claims are correct, those living in common-law jurisdictions have a major advantage over those living in civil-law ones, and the
growing "legal origins" literature purports to find evidence of precisely

that, through statistical analysis of rates of economic growth across countries while controlling for the presence or absence of a common-law legal
4

system.
Unfortunately, neither common law nor "statutes" are wellspecified terms within either the theoretical or the empirical literatures.
They are used with different and diffuse meanings. As both types of law

come in a wide variety of forms, this lack of definitional clarity contributes to a lack of precision in specifying models and testing hypotheses.
For example, the legal origins literature purports to distinguish "common-law" systems in former British colonies from civilian-influenced legal systems in the former colonies of other European colonial powers by
using a dummy variable that treats as equivalent the legal systems of India, Canada, and Nigeria on the one hand and Lebanon, Brazil, and C6te
d'Ivoire on the other.' Yet there are vast differences within these fami1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (1st ed. 1972) ("Our survey of the
major common law fields suggests that the common law exhibits a deep unity that is economic in character.").
2. For a survey of the literature, see Nuno Garoupa & Carlos G6mez Ligtierre, The Syndrome
of the Efficiency of the Common Law, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 287 (2011). The most historically grounded
attempt to understand common-law evolution is Daniel Klerman, JurisdictionalCompetition and the
Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007). It provides little support for the devotees of the efficiency of the common law. The author concludes that most discussions of common-law
evolution have little, if any, historical basis; they are pure theory or bad history.
3. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982).
4. Gani Aldashev, Legal Institutions, Political Economy, and Development, 25 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL'Y 257 (2009); Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001). The most critical claim is against French law since other civil-law systems (German and Scandinavian) perform at least as well as the common law in most of
the empirical studies. A recent critique is provided by Daniel M. Klerman et al., Legal Origin or Colonial History?, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 379 (2011).
5. For a general survey of the legal origins literature, see La Porta et al., supra note 4. The theoretical foundations are provided by Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 1193 (2002), and Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 401 (2003). The empirical papers include Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., CorporateOwnership Around the World,
54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the
World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000); Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003); Rafael La Porta
et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004); Juan C. Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1339 (2004); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth?, 9
J. ECON. GROWTH 271 (2004); Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1
(2006); Simeon Djankov et al., Debt Enforcement Around the World, 116 J. POL. ECON. 1105 (2008);
Aron Balas et al., The Divergenceof Legal Procedures, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 138 (2009). No-
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lies of legal systems. Moreover, the literature includes multiple, competing explanations for the hypothesized greater efficiency of the common
law, some focusing on supply-side mechanisms and others on demandside mechanisms, leaving the theoretical justification for a dichotomous
coding under-specified.6 There are also significant definitional issues
concerning the contextual meaning of common law, civil law, or statute
law (resulting in complex hybrid or mixed legal systems).
Although the current literature's analysis is largely ahistorical, it is
not the first debate over the relative merits of common law and statute
law. France's adoption of the Code Napol6on in 1804 sparked an extensive and wide-ranging series of exchanges among lawyers, legislators, and
the general public across the world over the merits of systematic codification relative to the common law.7 Napoleon carried his Code across Europe by force and persuasion, leading to adoption at various times of civil
codes related closely to the French code by Belgium; Luxembourg; the
Netherlands; a number of Germanic states including the Palatine,
Rhenan Prussia, Hesse-Darmstadt, the Hanseatic territories, Frankfurt,
Westphalia, and Hanover; most of the Italian states, including Genoa,
Parma, Lombardy, Modena, Venice, Tuscany, Naples, and the Papal
States; Portugal; and Spain.' Even before then, France, Denmark (1683,
then including Norway and Iceland), Sweden (1734), Austria (1786), and
Prussia (1794) enjoyed some form of codification.9 The French-, Portuguese-, and Spanish-influenced jurisdictions and colonies in the Americas
and Africa also created code-based systems, including the colonies that
became Latin American nations, the territory that became the American
state of Louisiana, and Quebec." In the Middle East, Egypt, Lebanon,
and Syria adopted French-influenced codes." Turkey was influenced by

tice that economic growth was conspicuously absent from their long list of dependent variables in the
earlier work.
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7.
world."

By 1868, the Napoleonic Code or codes related to it, governed "two-thirds of the civilized
Jean Limpens, Territorial Expansion of the Code, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE

COMMON-LAW WORLD 92, 102 (Bernard Schwartz ed., Greenwood Press 1975) (1956) (quoting 1
THEOPHILE HUC, LE CODE CIVIL ITALIEN ET LE CODE NAPOLEON 2 (1868)). The example of the

Code Napol6on continued to be discussed in the American debate throughout the century. See, e.g.,
ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., REPORT OF THE COMMITEE ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE LAW UPON
THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE 6-23 (Mar. 15, 1881) ("The soil of France was peculiarly adapted to the

growth of codified legislation.").
8. Limpens, supra note 7, at 93-95.
9.

Angelo Piero Sereni, The Code and the Case Law, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE
7, at 55, 55. The legal origins literature has found the Scandinavi-

COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note

an-derived codes to be correlated with higher GDP per capita. See La Porta et al., The Quality of
Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 244 (1999). For a discussion of the differences between preNapoleonic codes and post-Napoleonic codes, see Sereni, supra, at 57-59.
10. Limpens, supra note 7, at 98-100.
11. Id. at 102.

1446

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2012

the Swiss code. 12 Asia, Japan, and China adopted code-based legal systems influenced by European codes. 3
Even within the common-law world, codification was vigorously de-

bated, and sometimes adopted, either in part or as a system. Jeremy
Bentham wrote to President James Madison offering to codify the United States' laws in 1811, 4 and he repeated his offer in letters to state gov-

ernors several years later. 5 Thomas Jefferson pondered-and rejectedcodification as a law reform measure 6 and Americans debated what to
do with the English common law after independence. 7 The Louisiana
Purchase spurred a discussion over what form of law would govern in the

newly acquired territory. 8 Joseph Story coauthored a report for Massachusetts in 1837 that spoke favorably of the merits of codification while
concluding that the time was not yet ripe to undertake it. 9 Californians
considered retaining the region's Mexican civil-law system when drafting
their initial state laws in 1849 and, although they initially opted not to do
so, continued to debate it. z" Among other prominent advocates for codi12. See Arzu Oguz, Essay, The Role of ComparativeLaw in the Development of Turkish Civil
Law, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 373, 380 (2005) (noting that Turkey adopted "a direct translation of the
French version of the Swiss Civil Code" in 1926).
13. Limpens, supra note 7, at 101. A Japanese delegation visited California during that state's
codification process "and on their return took with them copies of the codes, portions of which were
afterwards incorporated into the laws of Japan." Oscar T. Shuck, The California Code of Laws, in
HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF CALIFORNIA 191,194 (Oscar T. Shuck ed., 1901).
14. Letter from Jeremy Bentham to James Madison (Oct. 30, 1811), in 8 THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 182 (Stephen Conway ed., 1988). Madison rejected the offer in 1816. Letter
from James Madison to Jeremy Bentham (May 8, 1816), in id., at 521-22.
15. CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 99-101 (1981).
16. James R. Stoner, Sound Whigs or Honeyed Tories? Jefferson and the Common Law Tradition, in REASON AND REPUBLICANISM: THOMAS JEFFERSON'S LEGACY OF LIBERTY 103,109-10 (Gary
L. McDowell & Sharon L. Noble eds., 1997); see also Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Reconciliation of the
Civil Law and the Common Law, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra
note 7, at 389, 393 ("Jeffersonians favored the reception in France of the civil law ... ").
17. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSONIAN, 1442. Common Law, Codification of., in THE JEFFERSON
CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 163 (John P.
Foley ed., 1900) ("Whether we should undertake to reduce the common law, our own, and so much of
the English statues as we have adopted, to a text, is a question of transcendent difficulty. It was discussed at the first meeting of the committee of the Revised Code [of Virginia] in 1776, and decided in
the negative, by the opinions of Wythe, Mason and myself, against Pendleton and Thomas Lee.").
18. Shael Herman, The Louisiana Code of Practice (1825): A Civilian Essai Among AngloAmerican Sources, 12.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L., May 2008, at 1, 2, http://www.ejcl.org/121/absl2l12.pdf. Tucker argues that efforts to introduce the common law in Louisiana were led by American
lawyers unfamiliar with the existing legal system. John H. Tucker, Jr., The Code and the Common
Law in Louisiana, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 7, at 346,
351.
19. JOSEPH STORY, Codification of the Common Law, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF
JOSEPH STORY 698 (William W. Story ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1852). Story was a proponent
of "what has been called 'moderate' codification," which would "make the law more manageable, as
well as unified." M.H. Hoeflich, John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives
on the Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 36, 75 (1985). Story
made use of civil-law scholarship and code provisions throughout his career, including in his Commentaries and judicial decisions. See id. at 64-71.
20. Ralph N. Kleps, The Revision and Codification of CaliforniaStatutes 1849-1953,42 CALIF. L.
REV. 766,766 (1954).

No. 5]

FABLE OF THE CODES

fication in California, Governor Leland Stanford insisted on "the absolute necessity" of codification in his 1863 address to the legislature,"' and
a civil code was ultimately adopted in 1872.22 Georgia (1861),23 the Dakota Territory (1865), 24 and Montana (1895)25 adopted civil codes as well,
the latter two heavily influenced by the Code Napol6on. 26 New York began official efforts at codification in 1846 with the adoption of a constitutional provision establishing a code commission 27 which yielded draft
codes in the 1860s that were debated in New York between 1879 and the
late 1880s.2 8 The proposed New York civil code even passed both houses
of the state legislature in 1879 and 1882, only to be vetoed both times by
the governor.2 ' The New York struggle produced a particularly voluminous literature of pamphlets, speeches, and articles on the topic, and led
New York lawyer James Coolidge Carter to write important anticodification works, 0 some of which were later cited by economist Friedrich von
21. Shuck, supra note 13, at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted). Codification was regularly
debated in California in the 1850-60s. Kleps, supra note 20, at 767-72.
22. Kleps, supra note 20, at 771-72; Rosamond Parma, The History of the Adoption of the Codes
of California,22 LAW LIBR. J. 8,20 (1929).
23. Roscoe Pound, Codification in Anglo-American Law, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE
COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 7, at 267, 272-73; Marion Smith, The First Codificationof the Substantive Common Law, 4 TUL. L. REV. 178, 178 (1930).
24. J.O. Muus, The Origin of the North Dakota Civil Code, 4 DAKOTA L. REV. 103,103 (1932).
25. Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws"- Lessons from One Hundred Years of Codificationin Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 359, 360 (1995).
26. Both were based on drafts prepared for New York as modified by California. Id. at 382-83.
The New York drafts were heavily influenced by the Code Napoleon. See, e.g., ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE BILL "To ESTABLISH A CIVIL CODE," AT THE JOINT MEETING OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES

OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY, FEB. 25, 1886, at 6-7 (1886) [hereinafter ARGUMENTS AGAINST]
("Mr.Rives said that he had compared the code now before the legislature with the Code Napoleon.
In their general arrangement and in the order of certain subjects and sections the two codes closely
resembled each other. He would not say that the proposed code was a translation of the French code,
but some portions seemed to be literally translated.").
27. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1846); see also David Dudley Field, Codification in the United States,
1 JURID. REV. 18,18-19 (1889).
28. The draft code "slept undisturbed in the limbo of legislative experiments from 1865 until the
winter of 1879, when the Bar of the State was startled by news of its adoption by both branches of the
Legislature."

1882).
29.

ALBERT MATHEWS, THOUGHTS ON CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW 6 (3d ed.

LucIus ROBINSON, Veto, Senate Bill, Not Printed, Civil Code, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF LUCIUS

ROBINSON, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 72 (1877); Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and

Right Answers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355, 364-65 (1999); see ALONZO B. CORNELL, MEMORANDUM
FILED WITH ASSEMBLY BILL No. 215, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CIVIL CODE," NOT
APPROVED, reprinted in ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITEE To
"URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE," REAPPOINTED NOVEMBER 1, 1881, at 8,8-9
(1882). The Civil Code also passed the Senate in 1888, but failed in the Assembly. ASS'N OF THE BAR
OF N.Y.C., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO "URGE THE REJECTION OF
THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE," REAPPOINTED DECEMBER 11, 1888, at 7 (1889) [hereinafter ASS'N OF
THE BAR OF N.Y.C., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT].
30. JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER IN OPPOSITION TO THE BILL
TO ESTABLISH A CIVIL CODE, BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (1887) [hereinafter
CARTER, ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION]; James Coolidge Carter, A COMMUNICATION TO THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE APPOINTED "To URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE," SHOWING THE
EFFECT OF THE ADOPTION OF THE CODE AS REVISED AND AMENDED UPON THE LAW OF GENERAL
AVERAGE 1 (1883); JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1907)
[hereinafter

CARTER,

GROWTH AND

FUNCTION];

JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER,

THE PROPOSED

1448

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2012

Hayek in his own arguments in favor of the common law." It also inspired a two-day debate in 1886 at a meeting of the American Bar Association, at which those present voted fifty-eight
to forty-one in favor of
2
reducing the common law to statutory form.1
Within the British Empire, Bentham forcefully advocated codification for years.33 John Austin similarly supported codification,34 and in the
1860s a Royal Digest Commission was given the task of "digesting" all of
the laws.35 Also during the nineteenth century, Britain undertook extensive law reform efforts at home that transformed large areas of the common law into comprehensive statutes.3 6 India began a codification effort
under Thomas Macaulay in 1833 that ultimately produced the Indian Penal Code (1860), Indian Contract Act (1872), and Indian Evidence Act
(1872), among others.37
Even these were not the first debates within the common-law world.
Codification has been part of the legal policy discussion in Britain since
the early days of the common law. While judicial precedents developed
the common law, the role of statutes and the need to simplify and systematize law was a matter of concern since at least the sixteenth century.38 Significant British legal scholars such as John Austin, Jeremy BenCODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW (1884) [hereinafter CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION];
JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF THE WRITTEN AND UNWRI-TTEN LAW (1889) [hereinafter CARTER, WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN].
31.
1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 74, 169 n.5,

174 n.2, 176 n.19 (1978) (citing and quoting Carter's works).

32.

William B. Fisch, The Dakota Civil Code: More Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 45

N.D. L. REV. 9,24 (1968).
33.

See JEREMY BENTHAM, 'LEGISLATOR OF THE WORLD': WRITINGS ON CODIFICATION, LAW,

AND EDUCATION (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris eds., 1998) (collecting Bentham's writings on
the subject).
34.

See 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW

669-704 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed. 1879).
35. Its first report is printed at Summary of Events, 2 AM. L. REV. 345, 361-64 (1868). Prominent British legal thinker Sheldon Amos wrote extensively on codifying English law. SHELDON AMOS,
CODIFICATION IN ENGLAND AND THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1867): SHELDON AMOS, AN ENGLISH
CODE (1873) [hereinafter AMOS ENGLISH CODE].

36.

See infra note 38 and accompanying text.

37. See 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 707, 708 n.98 (1959); see also BIJAY KISOR
ACHARYYA, CODIFICATION IN BRITISH INDIA 180-263 (1914) (describing the process of codification
in British India).

38. At different stages, there were significant efforts to codify the common law, although they
largely failed. Desmond H. Brown, Abortive Attempts to Codify English Criminal Law, 11
PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 1, 1-2 (1992). Edward VI was particularly supportive of codification in the
sense of consolidation of the common law. In 1547, a bill for the "Reformation of the Common Laws
of the Realm" was introduced but no legislation was approved. Id. at 3. The King was displeased with
the lack of action by the Parliament but died in 1553 before his concerns were addressed by Parliament, and his successors had less interest in consolidation and codification, although Sir Francis Bacon
made an attempt in 1614. See id.; Pound, supra note 23. at 267-68. The British government in the
1830s took the issue seriously and produced important criminal legislation through a procedure that,
according to one legal scholar, "allowing for the differences between the French and the British systems, was not unlike Napoleon's methodical procedure prior to the enactment of the Code Civil."
Brown, supra, at 17. By the mid-1830s, the discussion in Britain shifted to consideration of codification of particular areas of the law, mainly criminal law and procedure, through a method similar to the
French codification. A Criminal Law Commission was appointed (largely composed of practitioners)
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tham, Frederick Lawson, Frederick Pollock, and Glanville Williams participated in the debates. The explosion of statute law (there were around
2,000 statutes by 1547 and 17,000 by 187719) and important contradictions
in existing laws (for example, different sanctions were mandated by law
for the same offense40) led to a procodification movement, initially focused on consolidation in a consistent and simplified way. As one British
legal scholar has recognized, however, "[t]he history of attempts at codification in nineteenth century Britain is the history of a movement which
largely failed."41 The arguments for codification defended by its supporters were a "clear statement of the law within a manageable compass"42
and modernization of law. Eventually, however, these arguments were
to merge statute law and common-law principles of criminal law, and later reform it. Id. at 18: John E.
Stannard, A Tale of Four Codes: John Austin and the Criminal Law, 41 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 293, 300-01

(1990) (noting that the Commission was formerly appointed by William IV to produce a "Digest of the
Criminal Law" that consisted of consolidation of statute law, codification of the common law, and
preparation of a code of criminal law). A first code of criminal law was submitted to the Parliament in
1844 (this new code was largely a consolidation) and a code of criminal procedure in 1.845 (this one
was an important reform of criminal procedure significantly influenced by French law). Brown, supra,
at 18-19. A division between those who favored mere consolidation and those who sought broader
legal reforms killed both proposals. A new commission was appointed in early 1845 to "amend[] the
law where necessary" and submitted a new criminal code to the Parliament by 1853. Stannard, supra,
at 303-04. The judges were vehemently opposed and the codification of criminal law was abandoned
(although there were consolidation attempts, such as the Consolidation Acts of 1861). Id. at 305. A
new criminal code was drafted by James Fitzjames Stephen in 1878, although ittoo was never approved by the Parliament. id. at 305-06. A new criminal code was drafted in 1985. Id. at 309. These
efforts at codification in criminal law yielded several statutes including the Perjury Act (1911), the
Forgery Act (1913), and the Larceny Act (1916), but failed to achieve the significant reform its supporters sought.

V.V. Veeder & Brian Dye. Lord Bramwell's Arbitration Code 1884-1889, 8 ARB.

INT'L 329, 337 (1992).
Although criminal law was the main focus of codification in Britain, there were efforts in other
areas as well. There were also significant attempts at commercial law. A commission was appointed
in 1853 to consider consolidation and assimilate the commercial laws of England, Scotland, and Ireland; some influential lawyers even suggested a Code Victoria but that came to nothing. Alan Rodger,
The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain, 109 L.Q. REV. 570, 574 (1992). After the

developments in Germany, in particular the 1862 Common Commercial Code of the German confederation, the advocates of commercial law codification argued a similar statute was needed for Britain
and the Empire. Id. at 577. While influential lawyers and business interests demanded a commercial
law code and were supported by the advocates of British imperialism, the Parliament moved slowly.
Id. at 584-85. It approved some statutes to consolidate commercial law (for example, the Factors Act
(1889), the Partnership Act (1890), Sale of Goods Act (1893), and the Marine Insurance Act (1906))
but there was never a new commercial code. A possible explanation is that there were not significant
problems with the common-law principles and they varied little within the United Kingdom. Id. at
587.
Another serious attempt of codification was made in arbitration law. A code was proposed for
commercial arbitration in 1889. Veeder & Dye, supra, at 329-30. The reason seems to have been the
views shared by lawyers and judges that the rules of procedure followed by English courts were inappropriate for commercial litigation and were difficult to understand by non-specialists. Id. at 330, 334.
Some favored the French model of state-sponsored arbitration courts (the tribunaux de commerce)
staffed by business people. Id. at 331. Such solution would eliminate commercial litigation from the
English High Court. Id. at 344. Others proposed far-reaching procedural reforms but within the
common-law courts. The 1889 statute was largely modest and the effects were much less structural
than those defended by the supporters of codification. Id. at 332.
39. Brown, supra note 38, at 2.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Rodger, supra note 38, at 570.
42. Id. at 575.
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not as persuasive as the tradition of the common law and the perception
that a code "might prove difficult to adapt to changing circumstances."43
Many influential legal thinkers concluded that the values of English law
were inconsistent with codification except where "substantial reforms are
both necessary and urgent."" The debate in the United States was influenced by these events and debates, with both proponents and opponents
using the ideas of Bentham, Austin, Sheldon Amos, and other British
sources in their arguments.
Thus, at exactly the time when Britain and the United States were
experiencing unprecedented economic growth, substantial numbers of
thoughtful, well-informed lawyers and others concerned about law were
promoting replacing the common law with civil codes. Nations with civil
codes, like France and Germany, also experienced substantial economic
growth during this period. While it is possible that civil-law proponents
simply missed the connection between the growth around them and the
common law, we think it is more likely that the legal origins literature
missed some important points about how the law relates to economic efficiency. In this Article, we use insights from the nineteenth-century
American portion of these debates to reframe the issues involved in
comparing common law to statute law. Rather than focusing on poorly
specified labels, we suggest that the key to a legal system's ability to
promote economic growth lies in its ability to minimize transaction costs,
restrict rent-seeking, and cheaply adapt to changing circumstances. Different legal systems represent different mixes of strategies to accomplish
these sometimes-conflicting goals, and different circumstances make different emphases among those goals the efficient choice.45 Refocusing the
debate over the role of legal systems in economic growth in this way is
necessary if the law and economics literature is to contribute meaningfully to the economic development debate.
There is an important parallel in the earlier literature over path dependence in standards. In their classic article, The Fable of the Keys,
economists S.J. Liebowitz and Steven Margolis compared efficiency
claims for the rival QWERTY and Dvorak typewriter keyboards. 6 Contrary to popular belief that the QWERTY keyboard was less efficient
than the Dvorak, because the Dvorak keyboard minimized the distance
fingers had to travel while typing in English, they found that keyboards
had multiple dimensions of efficiency and that each keyboard had advantages over the other in at least one dimension. Much like the pre43. Id.
44. Veeder & Dye, supra note 38, at 334 n.22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting ROBERT GOFF, THE
SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLE 172-73 (1984)).
45. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin. Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 10-11 (1994) (arguing that creating systematic law codes was costly in Eastern
European transition economies because doing so diverted scarce resources away from wealthincreasing transactions during transition from socialist to capitalist economies).
46. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (1990).
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Liebowitz-Margolis QWERTY-versus-Dvorak debate in regard to keyboards, the common law-versus-civil law debate has focused for too long
on only a subset of the relevant efficiency dimensions.
In Part II, we analyze the efficiency claims of the common law and
legal origins literatures. We show how the lack of clarity in defining key
terms and specifying key mechanisms has led to misidentification of features related to efficiency and a nebulous conception of the common law
rather than with how legal systems cope with crucial problems. In Part
III, we turn to the nineteenth-century American debates' contributions
as a means of further specifying the features of legal systems that produce efficient rules. In Part IV, we use these insights to suggest a more
fruitful framework for assessing legal systems than the dichotomy between common and civil law.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF THE COMMON LAW

The common-law efficiency literature identifies the role of the legal
system in promoting economic growth as an important area of inquiry for
law and economics. The precise mechanism by which this occurs, however, is a matter of considerable debate, as we describe below. In addition to identifying the mechanisms by which a legal system moves towards efficiency in theoretical terms, it is also necessary to map the
theories onto the features of real legal systems. Here the common-law
efficiency literature is particularly problematic, since the degree of diversity of legal systems that fall within the labels common law and civil law
is large. In this Part, we identify problems with the efficiency of the
common law literature and show how these problems are related to misspecification of key terms.
A.

DefinitionalIssues

Posner argues that the common law provides a coherent and consistent system of incentives that generally induce efficient behavior, not
merely in explicit markets but in all social contexts (implicit markets).4"
For example, Posner contends that common-law rules reduce transaction
costs such that the rules favor market transactions when it is efficiency
enhancing to do so.48 He does not argue that all common-law doctrines
are economically justifiable, that they are simple to understand from an
economic perspective, or that judges have made explicit economic arguments to support their adoption of particular rules. Posner's formulation
of the initial efficiency claim for the common law thus rests on the idea of

47. See Posner. supra note 1, at 99.
48. Id. ("The presumption in such areas [where transaction costs are low] is that existing customs
and practices are efficient and rules intended to alter them are inefficient as well as futile.").
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an implicit economic logic to common-law doctrines. 9 While Posner's
formulation of the efficiency claim does not attempt to provide a complete theory of the common law, he offers an innovative explanation for
some of the major features of the American legal system and one that is
appealing to law and economics scholars both because of its focus on the
efficiency of legal rules and because it allows testing legal rules' efficiency through modeling.
To explain the implicit logic's source, Posner put forward a theory
of the common law related to Oliver Wendell Holmes' 1880s theory of
the common law.50 Both Posner and Holmes define the common law in
the Blackstonian sense. According to Blackstone, the common law consists of general customs by which judges and courts are guided and directed. 1 Thus, the common law includes all legal doctrines that do not
require a written form to be valid, but rather rely on the usage by
courts. 2 Holmes' primary argument is that the development of the
common law was driven by judicial responses to public policy issues presented by cases rather than by a consistent internal logic. In Holmes'
theory, the ability of the common law to adjust appropriately to external
needs derives from the judiciary's role as a representative of the community. 3 Notably, Holmes vehemently opposed the nineteenth-century
codification movement, asserting that the judiciary was better equipped
than the legislature to articulate appropriate rules. 4 Posner's understanding of the evolution of the common law is close to Holmes' formulation, particularly if we treat efficiency as a conceptualization for the evolutionary survival of what Holmes perceived as the superiority of the
common law rules and doctrines. In short, Posner provides a structure
49. Id. at 98-99. In the most recent edition, Posner puts it this way: "[Elconomics is the deep
structure of the common law, and the doctrines of that law are the surface structure. The doctrines,
understood in economic terms, form a coherent system for inducing people to behave efficiently, not
only in explicit markets but across the whole range of social interactions." RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 315-16 (8th ed. 2010).
50. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW (Dover Publ'ns 1991) (1881).
51. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405. This idea was widespread in the nineteenth-century United States. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 19, at 702 (noting that the common law "is
rather a system of elementary principles and of general juridical truths, which are continually expanding with the progress of society, and adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade, and commerce, and the mechanic arts, and the exigencies and usages of the country").
52. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67 (noting that "general customs" are "that law,
by which proceedings and determinations in the king's ordinary courts of justice are guided and directed"); id. at *69 (noting that judicial decisions are "the principal and most authoritative evidence,
that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form part of the common law").
53. Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1870) (unsigned article written
by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noting that it was "the merit of the common law that it decides the case
first and determines the principle afterwards" which provides over time "a true induction to state the
principle which has until then been obscurely felt." As a result, "[a] well settled legal doctrine embodies the work of many minds, and has been tested in form as well as substance by trained critics whose
practical interest it is to resist it at every step.") This view was shared by prominent anticodifiers like
James C. Carter. See CARTER. PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 25.
54. Sheldon M. Novick, Introduction to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Dover
Publ'ns 1991) (1881).
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for the Holmesian evolution of the common law, one that pushed the

common law toward efficient rules through judges' mostly unconscious
internalization of efficiency as a value and, through public choice theory,
to explain why statute law was inferior.
This reliance on a Blackstonian definition leaves many important issues unaddressed, however. The first problem is that the Blackstonian
understanding of the common law is not universally accepted even within
American or British legal thought.5 For example, Jefferson thought
Blackstone's "honeyed Mansfieldism" led to a "slide into toryism" by the
bar, in contrast to the role of Coke, which led to the "Whigism" Jefferson
thought necessary to the preservation of liberty. 6 And Jefferson stressed
that the common law was "written law the text of which is preserved from
the beginning of the 13th century downwards" whose "substance" was
"retained in the memory of the people and committed to writing from
' 57
time to time in the decision of the judges and treatises of the jurists.
For Jefferson, common law was "legislation, the particular origins of
which are lost in the mists of time, but origins that are in principle discoverable," making his difference with Blackstone a distinction between
Parliament and the people as the source of the legislative activity, the belief in which is "precisely what defines [a person] as a Tory or a Whig."5 8
In the Jeffersonian tradition, there was little room for a Holmesian (or
Posnerian) judge, since a judge's task was not to respond in a representative capacity or to choose an efficient rule but instead to discover a
preexisting social consensus. The Holmesian and Jeffersonian approaches suggest differences with respect to precedent, innovation, and other
key attributes of the legal system. Moreover, French civil law itself
served as persuasive precedent for Chancellor Kent, one of the greatest
American judges, who wrote that he could
generally put my Brethren to rout & carry my point by mysterious
use of French and civil law. The Judges were republicans [i.e. Jeffersonian democrats] & very kindly disposed to everything that was
French & this enabled me without exciting any alarm or jealousy, to
make free use of such authority & thusly enrich our commercial
law.5 9
Consider next the role of statutes. At least for much of the nineteenth century in Britain and the United States, statutes played only sec55.

See, e.g., Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone's Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.

1553, 1556 (2009) (describing Blackstone as "an outlier on his own court" due to his views on the
common law).
56. Stoner, supra note 16, at 103 (quoting Thomas Jefferson's Feb. 17, 1826 letter to James Madison) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 113 (quoting Jefferson's November 1785 letter to Phillip Mazzei) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
58. Id. at 113-14.
59. Vanderbilt, supra note 16, at 393 (quoting James Kent, An American Law Student of a Hundred Years Ago, in SELECr ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 843 (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. ed. 1907))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
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ondary and subordinate roles in the law, as declaratory (to restate the
common law) or remedial (to correct the flaws of the common law). But
even a critic of the common law as severe as Bentham thought British
common-law judges had "scrupulous adherence to following the declared
will of the legislator," 6 suggesting that there might be a larger role for
statutes within the common law than the Posnerian model suggests.
Most importantly, a binary conceptualization of common law and statute
law is inadequate to accurately describe the evolution of exactly those legal rules on which much of the common-law efficiency argument rests.
For example, one can argue that statutes provide certainty within a
common-law system by offering particularization of rules in some instances. 61 And prominent American legal thinkers articulated quite different visions of the role of statutory law. For example, Justice Cardozo
saw clear advantages in the codification process and recognized some advantages to the French legal method in shaping judgments.62 More generally, the nineteenth-century American codification debate demonstrates that multiple understandings of the roles of both the common law
6
and statutes existed throughout the common law's period of dominance.
In contrast to many of these earlier ideas about the role of statutes
in the common law, Posner contends that statutes that go beyond the
Blackstonian role are likely to be inefficient. In particular, Posner draws
on public choice theory's insights about the role of special interests in
legislation to argue for the absence of a basis for efficiency in legislation.6 Unfortunately for the theory, the evolution of many legal doctrines in the United States occurred through courts in some jurisdictions
and through legislatures in others, producing equivalent rules through
different processes. 65 Reliance on a Blackstonian definition is thus an
important limitation contained within Posner's (and related) claims,
although it is rarely explicitly discussed.
A third important issue concerns the role of customary law within
the common law. The lex mercatoria provided many commercial-law
60. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 205-06 (Charles Milner Atkinson ed. &
trans. 1914).
61. Sereni, supra note 9, at 73.
62. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142-80 (1921).
63. For example, Carter, one of the common law's great spokesmen, limited his definition of the
common law to "that body of rules for the regulation of the conduct of men in their ordinary transactions with each other which is enforced by the State." CARTER, WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN, supra
note 30, at 8.
64. POSNER. supra note 49, at 716-20.
65. For example, some states abolished privity and contributory negligence by statute and some
by court decision. Similarly some adopted comparative negligence by statute and some by court decision. See Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45 EMORY
L.J. 523, 575-76 (1996) (discussing flaws in studies of these doctrinal changes that do not properly distinguish legislative from judicial change). There are also similarities across legal systems. For example, "the case law developed for the protection of neighbors a set of limitations that, under the name
of abus de droit, produces about the same results as the Anglo-American notion of 'nuisance."'
Claude L6wy, The Code and Property, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD,
supra note 7, at 162, 167.
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doctrines and practices that promoted commerce; but statutory intervention was necessary to address rigidities and technicalities that were introduced through the common law into the law governing bills of exchange. 6 Getting the role of custom right can have important consequences.67 Moreover, the processes by which custom and case law are
developed differ dramatically, including the identity and method of selection of decision makers. If those efficiency properties derive from the
68
characteristics of decision makers, they should differ as well. If custom-

ary law is the source of efficiency properties, 69 some argue that much of
particular codified systems is based on customary law as well." Moreover, if the efficient rules come from custom, and a code embodies custom,
putting it in statutory form might preserve those rules better than leaving
them subject to explicit, ad hoc change through court decisions. Finally,
specifying a mechanism that distinguishes efficiency-enhancing customs
from efficiency-reducing ones is essential.
As these examples suggest, the argument for the common law's efficiency rests on underspecified terms that go to the heart of the issue.
Without clearly specifying what is meant by common law, including an
understanding of the roles of statutes and custom, grouping a wide range
of legal systems under the term is meaningless. This is particularly problematic for the legal origins literature, since its use of the term common
law is virtually synonymous with being a former British colony.71 Since
Britain's legacy to its former possessions goes well beyond a legal system
involving judicial opinions and powdered wigs, identifying the source of
the purported efficiency within the legal system (rather than in widespread use of English, Westminster-style parliaments, or financial ties to
London) requires examining the theoretical basis for the claim.

66. Janice Dickin McGinnis, Statute Law and the Owl of Minerva: The Bills of Exchange Act,
1882, 24 ALBERTA L. REV. 275, 292 (1986) (noting that the codification of areas of law was in part due
to law "becoming more technical and rigid").
67. For example, John Hasnas convincingly argued that Hayek's analysis of the common law
erred because of a fundamental confusion between case-based common law and customary law. John
Hasnas, Hayek, the Common Law, and Fluid Drive, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 79, 80 (2005). Samuel
Morison and Hasnas debated Hayek's interpretation of the common law and custom. See Samuel T.
Morison, Custom, Reason and the Common Law: A Reply to Hasnas, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 209,
210-11 (2007); John Hasnas, Confusion about Hayek's Confusion: A Response to Morison, 2 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 241 (2007); Samuel T. Morison, Rejoinder to Hasnas, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 258,

258-59(2007).
68. If the key is the common-law judge's selection of custom as enforceable, rather than the custom itself, this problem is partially ameliorated, although we now require a theory of why judges are
more likely to select efficiency-enhancing customs than nonefficiency-enhancing ones.
69.

Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analy-

sis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1551, 1625-26 (2003).
70. See C.J. Friedrich, The Ideological and PhilosophicalBackground, in THE CODE NAPOLEON
AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 7, at 1-3 (summarizing and criticizing this argument with

respect to the French code).
71. See La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 285-86.
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JudicialPreference Models

Posner's theory derives efficient rules through judges' values finding
their way into judges' decisions, where those values are related (perhaps

indirectly) to efficiency.72 This requires a mechanism for selecting judges
that select individuals with the relevant values (or alternatively, are not
subject to the same lobbying pressure as legislators, an empirically problematic hypothesis). Yet there is no mechanism to explain how, even
during the common law's period of dominance in the nineteenth-century
United States, judges in different jurisdictions would have shared the
critical set of values. Just during that time period, state judges (the most
important with respect to the common law) were selected by election,

legislative appointment, gubernatorial appointment with legislative confirmation, gubernatorial appointment with confirmation by a governor's
council, and with wide degrees of effort at restricting selection to "merit."73 Adding the heavily politicized territorial judiciary to the mix further complicates the picture.74 A consistent judicial preference for efficiency among judges selected by such a variety of methods requires the
preference to be extraordinarily widely shared. Moreover, although
Posner offers a convincing analysis of why the federal judiciary is designed to minimize the opportunities for special interests to influence
judges,75 his theory does not address state judiciaries where the differences in selection method may create different incentives for judges.76

72. POSNER, supra note 1.
73. EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 101-35 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1944) (describing methods of selection in each jurisdiction from 1776-1943); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo.
L. REV. 679, 713-15 (1994) (discussing differences across state courts).
74. See Andrew P. Morriss, Legal Argument in the Opinions of Montana TerritorialChief Justice
Decius S. Wade, 1 NEV. L.J. 38, 42-43 (2001) (discussing politicized nature of territorial judiciary).
75. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008); Richard A. Posner, JudicialBehaviorand
Performance:An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005); Richard A. Posner, What
Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1,
1-7 (1993). At times scholars focused on the federal judiciary without properly distinguishing it from
state judges subject to completely different incentive schemes. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 65, at 569
(stating that a "considerable body of political science research finds that judges tend to make decisions
in furtherance of their ideological leanings" in the context of common-law evolution, but citing only
research on the U.S. Supreme Court, which has almost no role in the development of the common
law).
76. Consider former Arkansas Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert A. Leflar's 1961 account
of why elected judges have an incentive to write well:
If the parties and their counsel are reasonably well satisfied with the quality of the opinion handed down in their case, the opinion may be off to a better start on its long-run law-making function
than if they pick holes in it from its inception, though initial dissatisfaction of this sort will not always or necessarily be a long-run handicap to an opinion. Strong dissatisfaction with an opinion
may, however, be a political handicap to the judge who wrote it, if he be an elected officeholder.
The political implications of a decision may, for the elected judge, be the most important aspect
of his opinion.
Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 811-12
(1961). Moreover, elected judges have strong incentives to favor rulings that redistribute wealth from
non-voters to voters. See also RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN
BE RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 6-7 (1987) ("For example, I am a backwoods
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More broadly, consider Lord Mansfield, responsible for the development
of efficient common-law commercial-law rules in Britain." Mansfield
''was a reformer who often strayed outside the restraints of precedents"
to adopt what he viewed as improvements to the law." Mansfield's role
in developing the common law was significant, yet his preferences appear
to be quite different from those of his contemporary fellow judges, since
it was Mansfield, and not the others, who is credited with introducing
major efficiency-promoting innovations.79
More generally, the messy reality of a common law made up of limitations imposed by multiple and conflicting precedents and subject to
significant shifts as the result of judicial efforts fits poorly into an efficiency-promoting approach as suggested by Posner.'
As Professor
Frank Cross suggested in criticizing the Posnerian model of judging, the
wide array of preferences a judge may be satisfying in a particular case
"could well produce a rather random body of decisions, at least at the
margin of doctrine."8 1 Not only is it sometimes difficult even for law and
economics scholars to identify which rule is the most efficient,' but Posner's efficiency hypothesis begs for a more detailed explanation for how
efficient rules would appear despite the apparent judicial disinterest in
efficiency, at least as expressed in common-law court opinions. 3 In parjudge who decides ordinary cases that are of absolutely no concern to anyone but the litigants. Most
of my day is consumed by working as the inside man at the judicial skunkworks where Islog through
tedious criminal, workers' compensation, and product liability cases. If I say to myself, 'the hell with
those Frenchmen at Michelin!' and give some injured West Virginian a few hundred thousand dollars,
it doesn't shatter the foundations of West Virginia's commercial world. Since I'm paid to choose between deciding for Michelin and sleeping well, I choose sleeping well. Why hurt my friends when
there is no percentage in it?"). As a result, judicial preferences-for the very reasons that make public
choice theory a compelling analysis of legislators' motives-are likely to vary.
77. See S. Todd Lowry, Lord Mansfield and the Law Merchant: Law and Economics in the Eighteenth Century, 7J. ECON. ISSUES 605, 609-11 (1973) (describing Mansfield's role).
78. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis As a ConstitutionalRequirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 70-71
(2001). Ironically, Mansfield's success was, in part, due to his ability to transcend the fact patterns of
cases and instead generalize principles from cases in a fashion similar to that used by code writers. He
also drew heavily on Roman law methods and principles. Lowry, supra note 77, at 610 (noting that
Mansfield was "strongly influenced by the Roman legal tradition" and "[wihile he recognized the factual orientation of the jus gentium, he in no way minimized the importance of the role of the legal
scholar in generalizing and rationalizing the popular usages of the merchants in terms of expediency or
efficiency and morality").
79. See Lowry, supra note 77, at 619.
80. Fisch notes that Blackstone's contemporaries might have found his "praise and rationalization of the status quo ... sufficiently at variance with the actual performance of the system to jolt the
sensibilities of many." William B. Fisch, Civil Code: Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial,43 N.D. L.
REV. 485,489 (1967).
81. Cross, supra note 65, at 571.
82. For example, see generally the economic literature about contributory and comparative negligence. The efficiency superiority of negligence rules over strict liability is still a matter of intense
discussion and depends on the specifications of the economic model. See generally ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS chs. 6 & 7 (6th ed. 2012).

83. Posner's initial explanation was particularly unsatisfying. POSNER, supra note 1, at 99
("[T]he character of common law litigation forces a confrontation with economic issues. The typical
common law case involves a dispute between two parties over which one should bear a loss. In searching for a reasonably objective and impartial standard, as the traditions of the bench require him to do,
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ticular, Posner's articulation of the hypothesis lacks an explicit mechanism for why judges would prefer efficient rules over rules that satisfy
their other preferences." Moreover, Posner's theory does not offer a
reason to believe a civil code-based legal system would be less likely to
promote efficiency than a common-law one. If a code was written by a
group with shared preferences for efficiency, the rules they devised
would also be efficient. While individual statutes drafted by legislators
can readily be attributed to rent-seeking, codes such as the Code Napo16on were created through a process that considerably restricted opportunities for rent-seeking."' Both processes have advantages and disadvantages. For example, in developing contract law, von Mehren argued
that:
The more satisfactory treatment accorded problems of formation
and form in the Civil Code, as compared with the common law,
seems to be due in large measure to the role that speculative and
systematic thought played in the evolution and ultimate codification
of French law. At least until recent times, the common law has not
benefited from any comparable efforts to think legal problems
through systematically and to develop a rationalized body of legal
solutions, rules, principles, and doctrines. Nor has the common law
had the benefit of a thorough legislative reshaping in the course of
which many inherited complexities and encumbrances could be discarded. In some areas of the law of contracts the common law may
be better today just because this has not taken place; but it would
seem that the common law pays a price in other areas-areas that
can benefit from rationalized, speculatively developed doctrines
and in which the greater freedom of action at any given point in
time ordinarily possessed by a legislature, as compared with a court,
can be of considerable importance in determining the shape the law
will take. 6
Responding to the need for a basis beyond the preferences of judges
through which the common law would develop efficient rules, a second
wave of law and economics analyses hypothesized an evolutionary prothe judge can hardly fail to consider whether the loss was the product of wasteful, uneconomical resource use. In a culture of scarcity, this is an urgent, an inescapable question. And at least an approximation to the answer is in most cases reasonably accessible to intuition and common sense.") Judges
see a wide variety of possible audiences for their opinions. A 1960 survey of twenty-five state supreme
court and U.S. Court of Appeals judges found they considered as their audiences: posterity, the bar,
future judges, the legislature ("to show that new legislation is needed to clean up the common law
mess in the general area"), law students, the readers of the New York Times, the author of the opinion,
the losing lawyer, and "my brother judges, so that I can get a majority of the court to go along with
me." Leflar, supra note 76. at 813-14 (citation omitted).
84. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103
(1979).
85. See, e.g., Arthur von Mehren. The Code and Contract-A Comparative Analysis of Formation and Form, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 7, at 110,
121-27 (describing the process of creating French Civil Code's contract provisions through abstract

reasoning).
86.

Id. at 126-27.
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cess through which the common law achieves efficiency. 87 These analyses
discussed the conditions under which respect for precedent would generate evolution to efficiency. Some theories focused on precedent (more
efficient rules are more likely to survive through a mechanism of precedent);w8 others relied on the incentives to bring cases and the role of court
litigation (since inefficient rules are not welfare maximizing).8 9 We turn
to these in the next Section.
C.

Evolutionary Mechanisms

The search for an efficiency-promoting mechanism more robust
than unarticulated judicial preferences initially focused on how litigation
pressures might improve the law, or at least a particular specific legal
doctrine, taking into consideration that only a self-selected subset of cases are actually litigated to the point at which an opinion is produced. 9° In
particular, the second wave of scholarship tied the efficiency of the common law to the observations that litigation follows private interests and
under some circumstances those interests have an interest in searching
for efficient rules." As a result, one branch of the literature posits that
inefficient rules are challenged more often than efficient ones, leading
court interventions revising rules to improve the overall efficiency of the
87.

"Evolutionary models" is the term used by Paul H. Rubin. Micro and Macro Legal Efficien-

cy: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 19, 20 (2005).
88. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 52-53
(1977). But see Victor E. Schwartz et al., Toward Neutral Principles of Stare Decisis in Tort Law, 58

S.C. L. REV. 317, 326-27 (2006) (arguing that tort law has evolved toward greater recognition of remedies for plaintiffs because plaintiffs' lawyers "are more likely than defense lawyers to ask for a departure from stare decisis" because the lawyers "have great leeway in determining trial strategy" compared to defense counsel and are forced to "think creatively and aggressively in developing the theory
of a case and drafting a complaint" rather than being risk averse and cost-sensitive like defense counsel). Civil-law systems accord persuasive effect to prior decisions, with greater respect given to "a consistent line of identical decisions." Sereni, supra note 9, at 68. The significant differences in the form
of decisions suggest different processes are at work.
89.

See, e.g., George L. Priest. The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.

LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977).
90. See generally FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING (2009);
PAUL H. RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENT RULES at
ix-xi (1983); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE: CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 464-65 (2009): Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve
the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi,
Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis, 26 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006)
[hereinafter Fon & Parisi, Judicial Precedents];Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003): Vincy Fon et al., Litigation,
Judicial Path-Dependence,and Legal Change. 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 43 (2005); John C. Goodman, An
Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law. 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981): Georg von
Wangenheim, The Evolution of Judge-Made Law, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 381 (1993). A critical
view of this literature is provided by FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 103-23 (2009).
91. The pressure would not be universal because some interests participate only infrequently and
because of the public good aspects of efficient rules. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 248 (1979) (making the point that judicial
opinions are a public good that arbitration fails to provide).
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law.9 2 Another proposes that lawyers would litigate to obtain rules that
advanced their own financial interests, with ambiguous efficiency consequences. 93
The assumptions necessary for these models introduced new issues
related to the definitional issues discussed earlier. If the common law
evolves from the application of principles to the specific factual context
of the case at hand, rather than from judicial efforts to impose desired
outcomes, the outcome will be affected by which facts are presented and
how they are presented. 94 If the subset of cases litigated does not present
factual circumstances conducive to triggering efficiency-enhancement,
litigation could bias the evolution of legal rules against efficiency.95 Further, the evolution of case law will depend on the factors that shape how
a case is represented in an opinion,96 which opinions are written and published, 97 and so on. Yet among cases, not all result in published opinions
92. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 89, at 67.
93. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994). But see generally Cross, supra note 65 (criticizing Rubin and Bailey).
94. See Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON.
43, 45-46 (2007) [hereinafter Gennaioli & Shleifer, Evolution of Common Law]; Nicola Gennaioli &
Andrei Shleifer, Overruling and the Instability of Law, 35 J. CoMP. ECON. 309 (2007) [hereinafter
Gennaioli & Shleifer, Instability of Law]; Thomas J. Miceli. Legal Change and the Social Value of
Lawsuits, 30 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (2010) [hereinafter Miceli, Social Value of Lawsuits]; Thomas
J. Miceli, Legal Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 157
(2009) [hereinafter Miceli, Selective Litigation]. Posner's original hypothesis argued that judges seek
efficiency whereas the later work by Rubin and Priest proposed an invisible hand. See supra notes 9093 and accompanying text. Gennaioli and Shleifer show that even if judges are efficiency-seeking,
precedent and overruling must be balanced in an appropriate way. A judicial bias might distort the
law in the short run but also provides the mechanism to improve the law in the long run. Miceli introduces the possibility of selective litigation to show that convergence to efficiency is still possible as
long as the biases do not overwhelm the likelihood that inefficient laws will be more often litigated.
Strong precedent is socially valuable if judges are significantly biased.
95. Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 585 (1992).
96. See, e.g., Susan F. French, Gruen v. Gruen: A Tale of Two Stories, in PROPERTY STORIES 75,
89-96 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009) (describing how the law could characterize differently the interactions and communications of family life and so produce widely different
legal results in the law of gifts depending on the characterizations).
97. Many courts do not publish all opinions and disputes continue over which opinions ought to
be published. Daniel N. Hoffman, Nonpublication of FederalAppellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYS. J.
405, 413 (1981) (describing disagreement among courts over publication of "cases where the facts are
intricate and unique, but no new rules of law are announced" with some courts considering these
"lengthy and laborious to prepare" and so excluding them while others require their publication as
"useful to a litigant with a similar fact situation"). Unpublished opinions have sometimes been unequally available to types of parties, creating advantages for those with greater access. Id. at 414 (noting unequal advantage for "institutional litigants... large urban law firms, and other powerful organizations"). Hoffman calculated that publication rates varied from 21.2% to 69.5% across federal circuit
courts of appeal in 1977. Id. at 423 tbl.2. To take just one example, consider the Ohio courts from the
1920s to the 1970s. These are important courts: Virtually all intermediate appellate court opinions
finally disposed of the case (ninety-eight percent in 1979); fewer than three percent of these opinions
were published. Robert L. Black, Jr., Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CIN.
L. REV. 477, 478 (1981). This reflected Ohio's decision to "eliminate the proliferation of unofficial
reports" by adopting formal rules in 1919 to restrict official reporting to a single reporter and to refuse
any "official sanction" to any opinion not reported in that reporter. Id. at 485. Yet by the end of the
1970s, unpublished decisions were playing an important role in the Ohio jurisprudence of the period:
Lower courts constantly refer to their own unpublished opinions as having precedential value and
cite the unpublished opinions of other courts. Unreported cases are cited in Ohio law review ar-
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(with the proportions published varying across time and across jurisdictions).98 Nor do reported opinions always accurately reflect the actual
decisions. For example, many important early English common-law decisions were delivered orally, making the reporters "not only editors and
digesters" but also the reporters of "the words which fell from the lips of
the Court," 99 suggesting that reporters' biases might also be important in
ticles and in Ohio law treatises.... [But] [n]one of [the] sources of information about Ohio's unpublished judicial opinions makes them available in the national arena .... Thus, although an
unpublished opinion is obviously enforceable between the litigants, and although it is open and
available for inspection at all reasonable times by the general public as a public record, the mass
of Ohio decisional law does not exist on the national scene.
Id. at 483-84. The result was
two bodies of law: one that is published and generally available, and another that is not published
and available only to special groups. It splits the bar, because only those who have the necessary
resources in time, money and personnel can make arrangements to gather, store and retrieve unpublished cases; those who can tend to be public legal offices (the attorney general and the county and municipal prosecutors) and the large urban law firms.
Id. at 486. Today, of course, Ohio opinions are widely available to anyone willing to pay for access to
Westlaw or LexisNexis. The point is that the shift in availability of the final opinions for the vast majority of Ohio cases from being barred from consideration as precedent (from the 1919 statutes) to
widespread use by some interest groups to widely available over the course of the twentieth century
would change how an evolutionary mechanism operated. See also J. Myron Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REV. 791. 798 n.36

(1975) (noting that a service for providing unreported opinions on search and seizure cases in California claimed that "subscribers from all over the state report winning case after case in trial courts by
citing unpublished opinions" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Of course, this will bias the selection of cases for litigation and the outcomes.
98. Hoffman, supra note 97, at 405, 407 (noting that regarding the practice of written opinions of
"relatively recent origin" federal courts follow "widely divergent plans or implemented similar plans in
widely divergent ways" on publication); see also Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18

CAL. L. REV. 486 (1930) (contrasting states whose constitutions require publication of all supreme
court opinions with those that do not). Publication decisions themselves may be influenced by a wide
range of factors, including the interests of the judges. See Jacobstein, supra note 97, at 798-99 (noting
a major decision in California requiring local governments to provide free legal assistance to indigents
in traffic violation cases was unpublished and that the lawyer for the appellant commented that its impact on local government finances was why he was "sure that's why the judges wouldn't have their
opinion published." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Charles E. Kenworthy et al., Opinions of
Courts: Should Number Published be Reduced?, 34 A.B.A. J. 668, 669 (1948) (noting that "[slome

judges will exercise self-restraint [in publishing opinions]. Others will not."); Andrew P. Morriss et al.,
Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63 (2005) (finding

the decision to publish related to opportunities for advancement for federal district judges in sentencing guidelines cases); see, e.g., Allan D. Vestal. A Survey of FederalDistrict Court Opinions: West Pub-

lishing Company Reports, 20 Sw. L.J. 63, 174-83 (1966) (finding no correlation between court workloads and opinion production for data from 1962); see also id. at 63 & n.3 (noting that trial courts in
Connecticut, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania publish opinions while courts in
many other states do not).
99.

Ass'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LAW REPORTING TO THE

(New York, Evening Post Steam Presses
1873). The classic English case of Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1707) illustrates this
problem. The case is reported in four English reporters: 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 11 Mod. 74
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 25

(as Keble v. Hickringill), and 3 Salk 9 (as Keble v. Hickeringhall). The East and Modern reports differ

with respect to the ownership of the land on which a wild animal is found. The court in Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 178 (N.Y. 1805) cited the Modern report and distinguished Keeble from the case
before it on a ground that would not have applied had it been using the East report (which was not
available until 1815). See A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 42 (5th ed. 2004).

This example seems particularly apt to us because Pierson is a case that is both foundational to the
teaching of property (Bethany R. Berger, It's Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v.

Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1091 (2006) ("Two hundred years after Pierson v. Post was decided, the case
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understanding the evolution of legal rules at a crucial time in the common law's development. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence
that the emergence of efficiency in the common law depends on a number of factors in the evolutionary mechanism, including initial conditions,
path dependence, and random shocks, 1°w all of which vary across time and
place.
Perhaps most importantly, if evolutionary pressures are the mechanisms that produce efficiency, we are left with no explanation for the persistence of major doctrinal differences across common-law jurisdictions,
unless the whole process depends on particular confluences of local de-

terminants. 01 These differences are particularly problematic. If the efficiency hypothesis is true, rules that do not promote efficient results
should be eliminated, at least in the long run, across all common-law jurisdictions. We observe, however, persistent substantive differences in
rules across common-law jurisdictions. This can be addressed in either of
two possible ways. One interpretation of the efficiency hypothesis is that
the evolution of the common law to efficiency is associated with multiple
equilibria. Under this interpretation, there are different possible efficient versions of the common law0 2 and the particular set of doctrines
that are efficient in any particular jurisdiction at any particular time will
depend on local determinants, selection biases, and other conditions. Alternatively, there might be one and only one efficient equilibrium that

the common law is able to achieve only under conditions not present in
continues to horrify successive generations of law students .... ")), and has been analyzed extensively
from a law and economics point of view. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Rohan Pitchford, An
Economic Analysis of "Riding to Hounds": Pierson v. Post Revisited, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 39 (2002).
The problems were even worse for early British decisions as British court records until around 1730
"were in law-latin, which no one but a lawyer and by no means all of them could understand." Fisch,
supra note 80, at 491. The problems were widespread. See, e.g., ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., supra,
at 10 (estimating that two-thirds of reports of New York cases are worthless); id. at 12 ("Your Committee find that the reports, with few exceptions, are carelessly prepared.")- id. at 14 (noting a decision
decided in 1862 for which the report did not appear until 1872, long after it had been reversed in 1863);
id. at 18 (noting printing of a dissent instead of a majority opinion); id. at 19 (noting "years often
elapse" before decisions are reported); id. at 20 (noting that Lord Mansfield "absolutely forbade the
citing of Barnardiston's Reports" because of their inaccuracy).
100. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); see also Henry N. Butler, Smith v. Van
Gorkom, JurisdictionalCompetition, and the Role of Random Mutations in the Evolution of Corporate
Law, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 267 (2006) ("American corporate law has seen numerous changes that
may be characterized as random mutations."); Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns of
Adoption of Tort Law Innovations:An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM.
POL. Sl. REV. 975, 984 (1981) (concluding that "the pattern of adoption [across states] for [the twenty-three plaintiff-oriented tort] doctrines [studied] is largely idiosyncratic").
101. Nuno Garoupa & Carlos G6mez Ligiierre, The Evolution of the Common Law and Efficiency, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2012).
102. Codification advocates like David Dudley Field stressed the differences across jurisdiction.
See Honorable David Dudley Field, Codification: An Address Delivered Before the Law Academy of
Philadelphia(Apr. 15. 1886), at 8 ("This common law is not the same everywhere; there is a common
law of England, a common law of Massachusetts, and a common law of Pennsylvania, and these differ
from one another in important particulars.").
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all common-law jurisdictions. Both results are problematic for efforts to
link economic development to legal system characteristics.
In multiple efficient equilibria models, the common law converges
to efficient doctrines and rules in the long run, but which doctrines and
rules are efficient is not uniform because of the differences in local conditions that affect the process of convergence to an efficient and stable
equilibrium. This allows the selection of disputes for litigation to differ
across the common-law world and across time in response to local conditions and asymmetric shocks. The circumstances under which a rule is
applied in different jurisdictions and at different times varies since different sets of cases are litigated." 3 As a consequence, the conditional probability that a given inefficient rule is challenged is not the same across
time and space. 1°4 The evolution of the common law would thus follow
different paths in different jurisdictions. Necessarily, the pattern of path
dependence will be diverse, leading to distinctive (but potentially equally
efficient once local conditions are considered) equilibria."'
There are two important implications for the efficiency hypothesis
of multiple efficient equilibria due to distinctive patterns of selective litigation. First, there is no single or unique common law as usually implicitly assumed by the literature"' but instead a multiplicity of possible
common-law systems, each with a claim to be efficient under particular
circumstances. If this is the case, the focus on particular doctrines or
rules in the abstract is no longer useful in evaluating the efficiency of legal arrangements. As a result, the efficiency claim becomes difficult to
evaluate empirically, since doing so would require identifying all of the
factors that go into determining efficiency rather than simply modeling
the rule. Second, the outcome of a common-law process in any particular
jurisdiction at any particular time is difficult to predict, as particular local
determinants might generate a completely new path.
In single efficient equilibrium models, diversity among jurisdictions
means that the common law develops the efficient doctrine or rule only
under certain conditions. The most immediate implication is that if doctrines and rules vary across the common-law jurisdictions, only one is efficient and the remaining failed to achieve efficiency. Given that the initial condition for most common-law jurisdictions is similar (English

103. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on the Common Law: General Principlesand Case Studies of the Decline of Employment-at-Will, 45 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 999, 1059-89 (1995) (describing circumstances under which the employment-at-will rule eroded in three areas across states).
104. See Miceli, Selective Litigation, supra note 94; Miceli, Social Value of Lawsuits, supra note 94;
Wangenheim, supra note 90, at 383.
105. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 100; Roe, supra note 100. Fisch speculates that the failure of
codification in New York was due to idiosyncratic factors such as "personalities, timing, and chance."
Fisch, supra note 32, at 53.
106. See Garoupa & G6mez Ligaerre, supra note 101 (discussing examples in tort law).
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law), 10 7 while their outcomes differ in many respects, a single efficient

equilibrium theory means that some judicial interventions produce efficiency but, under different conditions, other judicial interventions are
detrimental.
A second inference from this model is that the common law is efficient only under certain conditions, and not all common-law jurisdictions
satisfy those conditions at all times. A comparison across common-law
jurisdictions or across time demands a focus on the local judiciary and
the stickiness of precedent, among other characteristics.' Even within a
Blackstonian definition of the common law, there are crucial differences
across common-law jurisdictions in these areas. For example, British
common law is subject to a single court of last resort while American
common law is the product of multiple state courts of last resort. A rule
adopted in Britain need only persuade one court; to become widespread
in the United States, the rule must persuade multiple courts."° Yet the
final court in Britain decided "relatively few cases" until the late nineteenth century, leaving the law there less "fixed" than in the United

107. To some extent, different British colonies inherited different versions of the common law.
The thirteen original U.S. states took with them the common law as of the date of independence, although the exact nature of the reception of English law was unclear. Joseph Story described it as
bringing "the common law of the mother country, (England,) so far, as from its nature and objects, it
then was or might be applicable to their situation, as colonists, distant from and possessing institutions
and political arrangements varying from those of the parent country." STORY, supra note 19, at 698.
He concluded that it was "obvious" that they had not brought "the whole body of English law then in
force" and concluded that what applied in the United States was not the "original form" of the common law but "as it was then existing in England, modified, amended and ameliorated by statutes; and
as it was claimed as the birthright and inheritance of all the colonists." Id. at 698-700. As a result, he
concluded that Massachusetts' common law (in 1837) was
that portion of the common law of England, (as modified and ameliorated by English statutes,)
which was in force at the time of the emigration of our ancestors, and was applicable to the situation of the colony, and has since been recognized and acted upon, during the successive progresses of our Colonial, Provincial, and State Governments, with this additional qualification, that it
has not been altered, repealed or modified by any of our own subsequent legislation now in force
together with "those local usages and principles, which have the authority of law, but which are not
founded upon any local statutes." Id. at 701: see also generally William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 420-26 (1968) (comparing
differential treatment of English common law across several states).
108. Compare Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV.
409, 413 (1924) (providing Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice's analysis of stare decisis that contends
that "[r]ules ... should be subject to but slow changes"), with GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACt" (1974) (noting the legal realist critique of classical contract law as based on misstatement
of cases). The respect for precedent has varied considerably over time. See Sereni, supra note 9, at 66
(noting stare decisis "is of comparatively recent origin" and "developed slowly in England during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" while in the United States it "was never rigidly followed").
109. See, e.g., Edward H. Warren, The Welter of Decisions, 10 ILL. L. REV. 472, 475 (1915) ("It is
one thing to have all courts following a rule because that rule is imposed upon them by a higher
court-but how much greater weight does it carry when you find that court after court in the United
States has been presented with a problem and that they have felt that they could come to the same
decision -the decision not being imposed upon them by some higher court but being adopted by them
in respect to the decisions in other jurisdictions?"); see also Healy, supra note 78, at 55-91 (tracing the
evolution of stare decisis and concluding that "for most of its life the common law operated without a
doctrine of stare decisis").
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States."' As both the supply-side efficiency theories and Erin O'Hara
and Larry Ribstein have shown, jurisdictional competition is a key force
in the evolution of law,1" and thus such differences in the degree of competition within national legal systems should have an impact. Similarly,
common-law jurisdictions differ substantially in their attitudes toward
precedent across time and across jurisdictions in ways that would affect
the evolution of the law. For example, Joseph Story wrote in 1837 that
"[w]hen once a doctrine is fully recognized as a part of the common law,
it forever remains a part of the system, until it is altered by the legislature." 2 Well into the late twentieth century, New York's highest court
continued to hold to this theory while Indiana's more "modern" state supreme court felt free to alter the same long-standing common-law rule
based on its own assessments of the rule's merits."3
There are multiple possible explanations for why common law
would fail to achieve efficiency in some cases but not in others. Suppose
the distribution of relevant attributes of judicial preferences related to
efficiency varies among courts. For example, the proportion of proplaintiff and pro-defendant judges might vary across jurisdictions due to
differences in selection processes," 4 with the consequence that the number of proefficient-rule (whichever direction that is) judges varies as well,
so that in some cases the proportion of proefficient-rule judges is insufficient to force convergence to efficiency." 5 Alternatively, the intensity of
judicial biases related to efficiency might vary across the population of
judges, affecting the judiciary's ability to reach a consensus on a specific
outcome, "6 or creating more polarized conditions under which judiciaries

110. Pound, supra note 23, at 291.
111. See ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 3-4 (2009); Erin A. O'Hara
& Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1151
(2000): Zywicki, supra note 69, at 1619.
112. STORY, supra note 19, at 719; see also CARTER, WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN, supra note 30, at
28 (describing judicial task as "the examination, arrangement and classification of human actions according to the legal characteristics which they exhibit").
113. Compare Estate of Thompson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d 309, 310 (N.Y. 1987) (refusing to abandon rule that rights cannot be reserved in favor of a third party in a deed despite lack of policy rationale for the rule on grounds that courts cannot overturn earlier precedents), with Nelson v. Parker,
687 N.E.2d 187, 189 (Ind. 1997) (specifically rejecting Thompson and asserting the ability of courts to
alter rules). See generally GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS,
REAL COVENANTS AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 3.04 (2d ed. 2004) (examining this issue).

114. West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Neely's account (somewhat tongue-in-cheek) of the
thought processes of an elected judge suggest one reason such differences might occur. NEELY, supra
note 76, at 4 ("As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured
in-state plaintiffs, Ishall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else's
money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their friends
will reelect me.").
115. See generally Miceli, Selective Litigation,supra note 94 (discussing the divergent pressures on
judicial decision making): Miceli, Social Value of Lawsuits, supra note 94 (same).
116. See Dean Jaros & Bradley C. Canon, Dissent on State Supreme Courts: The Differential Significance of Characteristicsof Judges, 15 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 322, 326 (1971) (noting that intensity
affects frequency of dissents).

1466

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2012

may be less likely to achieve efficient doctrines and rules." 7 A varying
degree of influence of special interest groups in judicial politics could
contribute to shaping behavior in different ways that preclude some particular institutional arrangements from converging to efficiency."' Differences in the level of concern about the future evolution of the law (for
example, how forward-looking judges are) plays an important role in explaining efficiency. A judiciary more focused on the short run and less
on the long run is less likely to generate an efficient legal outcome than
one that pays greater attention to long-term consequences." 9 Given the
variation in judicial terms and degrees of security in office,12 there are
strong reasons to believe that the degree of future-orientation among
judges is likely to vary substantially across jurisdictions.
Moreover, evolutionary models depend heavily on having both a
sufficiently strong precedential impact of efficient decisions to protect
those decisions once reached and a flexible enough approach to allow
overruling inefficient precedents. Thus, the evolutionary theories face
the need to control defections from an established efficient precedent,
undermining the process of converging to efficiency, and inducing changes to allow evolution away from inefficient precedents. This requires
that the cost of changing precedent fall within a limited range: If the cost
of changing precedent is too low, the evolutionary mechanism to obtain
the long-run efficient outcome becomes unavailable because the judicial
gains from getting closer to an efficient outcome are insufficient to motivate the challenge when it is easy to change a precedent.12 If the cost is
too high, inefficient rules will rarely be successfully challenged.'22 Consequently the value of precedent plays an important role in the evolutionary theories, but it must fall within a range bounded by values high
enough to allow change and low enough to induce investment in obtaining efficient rules. Unfortunately for the theory, the treatment of precedent also varies widely across jurisdictions.'23 Moreover, the efficiency
117. See generally Gennaioli & Shleifer, Evolution of Common Law. supra note 94 (describing
how judges with polarized views are more likely to overrule precedent); Gennaioli & Shleifer, Instability of Laws, supra note 94 (same).
118. See Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An
Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 397-98 (2008).
119. Id. at 399-400.
120. See Morriss, supra note 73, at 737-38; Haynes, supra note 73, at 101-35 (describing differences in term length and retention mechanisms).
121. See also ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923) ("Law must be
stable and yet it cannot stand still. Hence all thinking about law has struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability and of the need of change.... If we seek principles, we must seek
principles of change no less than principles of stability."). See generally Gennaioli & Shleifer, Instability of Laws, supra note 94, at 311 (discussing how it is more costly to overturn precedent than to distinguish it); Miceli, Selective Litigation, supra note 94, at 159 (melding the literature on law and economics with the literature on judicial bias).
122. See generally Wangenheim, supra note 90 (discussing the constant rechallenging of legal rules
leading to more efficient rules persisting).
123. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 244, 602 (3d ed.
2007); see also discussion of Estate of Thompson v. Wade, supra note 113.
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theories tend to focus primarily on precedents that establish firm rules.
The many instances of purely persuasive precedent playing a significant
role suggest that a richer conception is needed.'24 Further, as noted earlier, courts differ in their production of precedent, including the rates at
which they publish opinions and which types of courts publish opinions
at all. Moreover, this explanation does not suffice to distinguish the civil
codes from the common law. The Code Napol6on covered torts in just
five sections, making the details of tort law under it a matter of judicial
25
decision making.
Drawing on this discussion of the two types of evolutionary models,
we can derive a more complex overview of the common law's operation.
First, there is not a single common-law rule or doctrine in many areas,
but a multiplicity of possible equilibria depending on the conditions that
determine which disputes are litigated, which opinions are written and
published, and so forth. One or more of these outcomes may be efficient. Second, for each specific set of circumstances determining which
disputes are litigated, which opinions are written and published, and so
forth, there is no guarantee of a convergence to efficiency, as that depends on the combined effects of judicial attributes and the treatment of
precedent. The most important consequence of such a richer view is that
the identification of the efficiency of the common law is more intricate
and multifaceted than assumed by the standard literature. If there are
multiple efficient solutions, it is unclear what the optimal common law
should be. If there is a single efficient solution, an explanation for why it
is reached in some jurisdictions and not others is necessary. Given that
the variables that determine efficient outcomes vary, a complete economic analysis would require a clear understanding of local determinants
one could
and specific conditions, including judicial preferences, before
126
support the hypothesis that the common law is efficient.

124. In addition, a richer theory of the role of persuasive precedent is needed. Persuasive precedent plays an important role in a number of instances. For example, a San Francisco probate judge
sold collections of his opinions, which "by virtue of his learning and great ability as a judge... [were]
of exceptional value to a practitioner." Fred H. Peterson, Court Opinions and Reports, 86 CENT. L.J.
at 428, 430 (1918); see also Gerald T. Dunne, The Unreported Opinion-An Appeal to the Banking
Bar, 99 BANKING L.J. 387 (1982) (describing "[a] recent letter from a prominent law firm to this Journal [which) requested authenticating data with respect to an opinion carried in its pages over a halfcentury ago but still of critical relevance to current litigation. Extensive research indicated that the
opinion had not been reported, officially or otherwise, elsewhere and that the Journal reference was
the sole indicia of its existence.").
125. Vanderbilt, supra note 16, at 395.
126. Garoupa & G6mez Ligiierre, supra note 101.
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The Role of Legislation

Even at the common law's high watermark, there were significant
statutory interventions. In some cases, statutes might be inefficient interventions where they displace or change earlier common-law rules. In
others, statutes could represent "corrections" to common-law problems,
as with Hayek's argument that statutes are needed to rescue the common
law from dead ends.'27 Statutes could also be efficiency enhancing by reducing transaction costs, as general incorporation statutes were in the
United States. 2 8 Moreover, judicial interpretation of statutes may fulfill
a common-law-like function at times, creating innovations that would not
have arisen absent the statute and that can be efficiency enhancing. 12 9 A
full theory of the efficiency of the common law needs to account for the
role of statutes and legislatures within the law beyond simply attributing
rent-seeking to legislators in creating statutes. Thus far, however, there
is little within the common-law efficiency literature that examines the
role of legislation in depth.
In general, efficiency theories focus on the argument that private interests are more likely to capture the legislature than the courts, 30 alt-

127.

HAYEK, supra note 31, at 88-89; see also RICHARD FLOYD CLARKE, THE SCIENCE OF LAW

AND LAWMAKING 300 (London, Macmillan & Co. 1883) ("That a case law has defects, all will admit.
That, in some instances, these defects can be removed by legislation, and by legislation only, all will
admit."); STORY, supra note 19, at 733 (noting that a code would be "a fit opportunity for the legislature to supply some of the acknowledged defects, to cure some of the admitted anomalies, and to correct some of the erroneous doctrines, which, in a long succession of ages, have gradually been ingrafted [sic] upon our common law"); CARTER, WRITTEN AND UNWRITrEN, supra note 30, at 18 ("From
time to time, progress and change in social conditions require corresponding changes in the law, which
can be effected only through the instrumentality of statutes .... "). Carter also argued that rules
where the content was less important than stability (e.g. concerning Bills of Exchange) should be handled by statutes. Id. at 54.
128. See discussion by Ron Harris and Naomi Lamoreaux comparing the United States and British approaches to incorporation. Ron Harris & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Contractual Flexibility Within
the Common Law: Organizing Private Companies in Britain and the United States (2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.econ.yale.edu/facultyl/lamoreaux/Contractual-Flexibility-10.pdf.
129. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in
the Development of American Patent Law: 1790-1870, 19 S. CT. ECON. REV. 143 (discussing the development of patent claim out of practice and ratification by courts). Bentham, however, warned against
this, arguing that "it will be necessary to forbid the introduction of all unwritten law. It will not be
sufficient to cut off the head of the hydra: the wound must be cauterized that new heads may not be
produced." JEREMY BENTHAM, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 209-10 (Edinburg, William Tait 1839). Thus even code systems are likely to differ

in the role assigned interpretation. See CLARKE, supra note 127, at 294-95 (comparing French and
Prussian codes on the role of interpretation). Many nineteenth-century common-law partisans appear
to have believed that civil-law systems left no room for interpretation. See, e.g., MATHEWS, supra note
28, at 18 (discussing the "radical difference" in how law was administered in civil- and common-law
jurisdictions). This view continues in some modern writings. Codes, however, differ in the degree to
which they leave matters for courts to interpret. See Fisch, supra note 80, at 501 (discussing how Field
draft codes had a "style of draftsmanship" that was "dogmatic and precise and tends ... to be dominated by rules rather than principles" and so restricted interpretation, while other codes left more
room for it).
130. See Michael A. Crew & Charlotte Twight, On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice Perspective, 66 PUB. CHOICE 15, 25 (1990) (arguing that common law is less subject to rent-seeking than

No. 5]

FABLE OF THE CODES

hough such argument is debatable theoretically and empirically,"t requir-

ing a comparative assessment rather than a blanket assertion.132 Most

importantly, the production of statutes differs in important ways across
jurisdictions and across time, which should have consequences for the
degree of rent-seeking and rent-dissipation. Considering just the United
States today, state legislatures range from part-time groups of poorly
paid members meeting infrequently for comparatively brief periods
(Texas) to well-paid bodies with professional staffs effectively in contindifferent deuous session (California).133 Code systems have suffered
3
grees of intrusion by statutes outside the code framework. 1
There are differences across time as well. For example, both the
opportunities for communication of policy ideas among legislatures and
the role of the federal government in affecting state policy choices have
changed over time, affecting the speed with which legislative innovations
spread. " 5 Moreover, the incentives for legislators are affected by election
law changes. For example, the nineteenth-century series of Reform Acts
in Britain dramatically changed the electorate and constituency boundaries for Parliament, while in the United States both the populations eligible to vote and voting rules changed substantially over that same periimpacts on the ability of special interod, all changes that must have3had
6
ests to engage in rent-seeking.'
Moreover, legal and political cultures differ across jurisdictions, and
some may be more "innovative" than others. 37 There may be interaction
statute law); Rubin, supra note 3, at 206-07 (arguing that both are influenced by private interests to
advance their goals).
131. The most devastating criticism is GORDON TULLOCK, THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON
LAW (1997) and GORDON TULLOCK, Rent-Seeking and the Law, in 5 THE SELECTED WORKS OF
GORDON TULLOCK 184-95 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005). See also Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Litigationand Legal Evolution: Does ProcedureMatter?, 152 PUB. CHOICE 181,181 (2012).
132. See, e.g., W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, ConstitutionalChange in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1979); W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, The Executive Branch
in the Interest-Group Theory of Government, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875
(1975); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987) (discussing several theories of capture in rule making); Thomas W.
Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify JudicialActivism After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
219 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY
959 (1997).
133. See Troy Senik, California'sLegislative Blitzkrieg, 21 CITY JOURNAL, Spring 2011, available
at http://www.city-journal.org/2011/212-snd-california-legislature.html.
134. Sereni, supra note 9, at 58-60.
135. Susan Welch & Kay Thomson, The Impact of FederalIncentives on State Policy Innovation,
24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 715, 725-27 (1980).
136. See Oonagh Gay, Voting Systems: The Jenkins Report, at 9-12 (House of Commons Library,
Research Paper No. 98/112, 1998), http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp9-112.pdf
(describing history of British election reforms); Rick K. Wilson, Partisanship and Electoral Reform:
Change in Congressional Cohesion, 1877-1932 (Oct. 3, 1998) (unpublished manuscript), http://
rkw.rice.edu/Papers/Partisan.pdf (describing U.S. electoral reforms and impact on Congress).
137. See Canon & Baum, supra note 100. at 979 (discussing differences in adoption rates of twenty-three tort law doctrines). Canon and Baum found that states' "innovation scores" (based on speed
of adoption) changed significantly between pre-World War II and post-World War II and that judicial
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graphic factors may influence adoption of particular types of statutes.
Some jurisdictions regularly enforce rules like the "single subject rule,"

which impede legislative deal making while others either lack the rule or

do not enforce it.'" Some statutes are drafted by interest groups; others
are the product of entities like the Uniform Law Commissioners, which
are widely thought to have often avoided rent-seeking. 4' Partisan and

other differences lead to different interests having greater or lesser influence in different jurisdictions.'4 2 Different degrees of political competi-

tiveness, whether a result of cultural differences or gerrymandering,
could have an impact on rent-seeking.

More broadly, civil-law systems' codes are subject to significant constraints in the codification process'43 whereas stand-alone statutes in both
innovation scores were only "moderately related" (correlated at 0.276) with legislative innovation
scores. Id. at 978-79: see generally Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1174 (1973) [hereinafter Gray, Innovation] (examining the diffusion of innovation
across state lines); Virginia Gray, Rejoinder to "Comment" by Jack L. Walker, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1192, 1193 (1973) (disputing whether or not there is a quality of "innovativeness" in states that can be
measured (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jack L. Walker, Comment: Problems in Research on
the Diffusion of Policy Innovations, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1186 (1973) [hereinafter Walker, Comment]
(discussing the problems of using diffusion theory in political science); Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion
of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. Sct. REV. 880 (1969) (applying diffusion of
innovation to the states).
138. Gray, Innovation, supra note 137, at 1176.
139. Id. at 1182 (finding that innovative states in some areas "are both wealthier and more [politically] competitive than their sister states at the time of adoption of a particular law").
140. See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITr. L. REV.
803, 803 (2006). Random events like "[t]he presence of a single aide on a legislative staff who is enthusiastic about a new program, or the chance reading of an article by a political leader can cause
states to adopt new programs more rapidly" than they would otherwise. Walker, Comment, supra
note 137, at 1189-90.
141. Professor William Henning, a participant, describes the Uniform Law Commissioners' process as follows:
[Tihe process by which Code amendments and revisions are produced involves multiple years of
careful work by a dedicated committee drawn from the ranks of NCCUSL and the AL, none of
whose members have a political stake in the outcome; at least one dedicated reporter who is a top
scholar in the field; hands-on oversight by the leadership of the sponsoring organizations; an open
process where the only price of admission is the travel costs involved in attending meetings and
where there is a full opportunity to explain one's needs to the committee and other observers:
and multiple exposures at annual meetings of both sponsoring organizations, where many members have a deep knowledge of commercial law and long experience as judges, practitioners, and
academics.
William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 Duo. BUS. L.J. 131, 141 (2009). At
least some commentators see the Uniform Law Commissioners as producing "real codification of substantive common law." Smith, supra note 23, at 189. Uniform laws also respond to a "need for consistent uniformity in the judicial interpretation of such laws." Shelden D. Elliott, Techniques of Interpretation, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 7, at 80, 90. This
likely changes the incentive structure for decisions.
142. See generally Robert D. Brown & John M. Bruce, Political Parties in State and Nation: Party
Advantage and Party Competition in a Federal Setting, 8 PARTY POL. 635 (2002) (discussing party differences in different jurisdictions); Thomas M. Holbrook & Emily van Dunk, Electoral Competition in
the American States, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 955 (1993) (referring to literature on political competitiveness).
143. See generally Andr6 Tunc, The Grand Outlines of the Code, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND
THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 7, at 19, 23-24 (discussing constraints of completeness, gener-
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civil and common-law systems are not. Statutes within a code are subject
to additional constraints, as they must fit logically within the existing
framework of code provisions to be included within the civil code. Roscoe Pound argued that "[p]atchwork overruling along with patchwork
legislative tinkering often does at least as much harm to the legal system
as it does good."'" Since both systems are actually mixed systems, evaluating their efficiency-producing or destroying properties requires more
nuance. If the relevant issue is the proportion of statutes, perhaps interest group or rent-seeking theories would predict the common law would
be superior.
Some claim a promarket bias of the common law as the result of
Hayekian, bottom-up efficiencies in the English legal system and topdown inefficiencies in the French legal system.1 15 The traditional efficiency analysis, however, could be transposed to civil law in many ways
and multiple forms. It could be argued that general law (code) is more
efficient than specific statutory interventions (potentially prone to more
capture) and that the efficient code crowds out some rent-seeking statutes from intruding into areas covered by the code. 46 Similarly, a commentator on Georgia's Civil Code argued that the effect of the code on
the case law was to make the case law "more readily understood" since it
provided a code section that could serve as a "governing principle" and
then be "the natural starting point of the judge's opinion."'47 A code system might provide more bottom-up law (for example, case law accruing
under general code provisions) than a common-law system that includes
numerous specific statutes which lead to more top-down law. Nothing in
the discussion so far makes the argument unique to common law or provides a complete framework to derive implications for comparative law.
ality, and logical organization imposed by codification in France). Codifiers in Dakota Territory and
Montana pointed to their jurisdictions' problems with keeping statutory law organized as a reason to
adopt the constraints provided by codification. Decius S. Wade, Former Mont. Territorial Supreme
Court Justice & Code Comm'r, Necessity for Codification. Address to the Helena Bar Association
(Apr. 5, 1894), reprintedin Andrew P. Morriss, Decius S. Wade's Necessity for Codification, 61 MONT.
L. REV. 407, 427 (2000); Morriss, supra note 25, at 372-75 (describing adoption in Dakota); id. 386-402
(describing adoption in Montana); see also generally, EVA STEINER. FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 29-30
(2002) (describing French codification).
144. Pound, supra note 23, at 291-92.
145. See Mahoney, supra note 4 (discussing Hayek's view that the common law allows more market activity, since it allows more individual liberty). A closer example suggests that the claim of some
anti-market bias in French law is debatable at best. See Benito Arrufiada & Veneta Andonova, Common Law and Civil Law as Pro-Market Adaptations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 81. 82 (2008); Benito
Arrufiada & Veneta Andonova, Judges' Cognition and Market Order, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 665, 665
(2008).
146. Some observers argue that the most important difference between code and common-law
systems is "the method by which rules are developed and of the material on which the law is based."
Smith, supra note 23, at 179. Smith characterized civilian reasoning as "to found its jurisprudence upon an exact and authoritative text, and upon commentaries based on the text" while the common law
focused on case reports. Id. at 179-80. It is not clear that the former method is more prone to rentseeking than the latter. Fisch phrased the issue as the two systems having different hierarchies of
sources with which to resolve unprovided-for cases. Fisch, supra note 80, at 499-500.
147. Smith, supra note 23, at 187.
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Moreover, courts and legislators have their own goals in terms of
enhancing their influence, complicating the potential effect of private interests in lawmaking.1 48 If we assume for the sake of discussion that statute law attracts more rent-seeking and produces more rent dissipation in
the process of creating rules than the common law does,' 149 the growing
predominance of statute law in many common-law jurisdictions suggests
a decline over time in the overall efficiency of the law within those jurisdictions. 150 Even during the common law's period of dominance in the
nineteenth-century United States, state legislatures passed large numbers
of statutes: one estimate of the New York legislature's output found
23,300 chapters of statutes from 1830 to 1876, of which 6,000 were affected by 11,000 amendments, and 1,658 chapters enacted between 1883 and
1885. 151 Since the rate at which statutes are created and change, and the
subject areas within which change occurs, differ across jurisdictions,
there should be a varying impact on economic growth across jurisdictions
and within jurisdictions across time. Before one can meaningfully distinguish a common-law from a civil-law jurisdiction, it is thus necessary to
account for the role of statute law within each.
E.

ComparativeLegal Systems

The common-law efficiency literature that follows Posner's initial
hypothesis is rarely comparative but generally focuses on the American
version of judge-made law that it labels common law. The legal origins
literature attempts comparisons, but based on what we have shown to be
an inadequately nuanced categorization. In short, a particular commonlaw jurisdiction may have more in common with some other civil-law jurisdiction than it does with other common-law jurisdictions. The common law includes both judge-made law and statutes and the civil law includes both judge-made law interpreting the statutory law and statutes
(both within and outside of a particular civil code).'52 There are, of
course, differences, as judicial decisions in the two systems are construct-

148. See A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation,77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 477 (1999). For an interesting
comparison between lawmakers and their influence under English and French systems, see J.W.F.
ALLISON, A CONTINENTAL DISTINCTION IN THE COMMON LAW: A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE ON ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW (1996).
149. Todd J. Zywicki, Spontaneous Order and the Common Law: Gordon Tullock's Critique, 135
PUB. CHOICE 35, 47 (2008).
150. See Rubin, supra note 87, at 23 (noting that the common law might have been more efficient
in the past when the organization of interests was more costly, but not now). Also, these arguments
face a serious challenge in areas such as antitrust law that are statute law precisely because the traditional principle of fair trade in common law did not protect market competition and courts were excessively deferential to monopolies.
151. ARGUMENTS AGAINST, supra note 26, at 12-13.
152. See generally Garoupa & G6mez Ligtierre, supra note 2, at 296 (mainly in the context of
French tort law).
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ed differently and so different incentives may apply to their production. 153
As we have described, there are also differences in these areas within the
families as well.
One possible response to our argument is that the common-law efficiency claim is actually a claim about the superiority of judicial over legislative creation of substantive legal rules. If this is so, however, the efficiency claim should hold in any jurisdiction with respect to judge-made
law (better known in civil-law jurisdictions as general principles of law
developed by courts). Just as inefficient common-law decisions are theoretically overruled, the judiciary could effectively correct inefficient statutes in civil-law systems through interpretation. 5 4 Moreover, codesystem judges may be more constrained by the structure of the code than
common-law judges who view themselves as the ultimate arbiters of the
law.' 55 If the general principles were themselves efficiency-promoting,
such constraints would increase efficiency. In fact, from the perspective
of civil-law countries, the claim could be rephrased as 'court interventions improve the overall efficiency of the legal system' either because of
the common biases of litigation (i.e., less efficient laws will be subject to
more court interventions than more efficient laws) or because of a Posnerian instinct for efficiency on the part of the judges. But this then returns us to the problems identified earlier with respect to differences
across jurisdictions and across time with respect to the means by which
judge-made law might exert influence. If there were more occasions for
court intervention and judgment in a common-law legal system than under code law, and all (or most) interventions were efficiency-increasing,
the appropriate mutation towards efficiency would be faster in common

153. See Sereni, supra note 9, at 60-61 ("[A]n English or American legal rule might often appear
to a civil-law lawyer to be so particularized as to constitute a solution d'espce; that is, the application
of a legal provision to the solution of a particular case rather than a legal provision of general scope
and authority. On the other hand, the civil-law regle juridique may appear at times to an AngloAmerican lawyer to be nothing more than an abstract precept or at most a general directive rather
than an actual legal provision."). The role of juries in common-law jurisdictions also potentially influences the substance of rules to allow judges to control which issues reach juries for decision. Morriss.
supra note 73, at 695; Sereni, supra note 9, at 70 ("Because of the existence of the jury system and of
the distrust of judges toward jurors, many questions that from a logical point of view should be characterized as problems of fact are treated in common-law countries as problems of law.").
154. See, e.g., Fon & Parisi, Judicial Precedents, supra note 90, at 520 (discussing jurisprudence
constante); Max Rheinstein, The Code and the Family, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-

LAW WORLD, supra note 7, at 139, 158 ("[T]he role of judicial lawmaking in the field of family law has
been no less in France than in the United States [and] equally considerable in other Continental countries ....
");Tunc, supra note 143, at 26 ("In thus applying the law, the courts [in civil-law systems] create a new body of law, although a secondary one."); see also Elliott, supra note 141, at 83-84 (describing a range of civil code interpretation methods). This idea is not new. Napoleon thought his code
should have allowed more room for interpretation, arguing that interpretative freedom was an important feature in a code based system: "'Injustice ...can be found in judges because they are men;
but it is against the nature of things that it should never be found in the law, and that the law should
' Friedrich, supra note 70, at 11
force the judge to be unjust against his own better judgment ....
(quoting Napoleon Bonaparte).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 187-89.
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law than in civil law but it would still occur in both systems. It is not obvious that any of these assumptions are correct, however.
The processes by which these changes occur would have to be carefully analyzed to determine which are more likely to occur in practice.
Further, the relative efficiency of judge-made versus statue law by itself
does not provide a good framework to justify the superiority of the
common-law system as compared to the civil-law system. As we have
noted, statute law is important in common-law jurisdictions, and many
important areas of private law such as torts or even commercial law are
essentially case law in civil-law jurisdictions (for example, tort law in
France is largely derived from judge-made law). 56 At the end of the day,
the efficiency hypothesis does not set common law in a better position
than civil law in the evolution toward efficient rules, as it does not by itself provide a framework to argue that judicial precedent is a superior
way to promote an efficient solution than a statutory rule just because
the focus is on judge-made law. 57 As we discussed earlier, there will
surely be differences across both common and civil-law systems in the
frequency with which such events would occur, making broad generalizations about systemic frequency problematic. Moreover, such a conclusion relies on the inability or the incapacity of those engaged in statute
creation and modification to supplement any delays in the evolutionary
process in both systems. Thus, the assumptions underlying the claim for
the efficiency of the common law over the civil law are convoluted and
debatable. Finally, the competition between common law and civil law
in hybrid systems does not provide an empirical answer as to which legal
system will prove superior in the long run (since we would expect the
most efficient legal system to be chosen by the relevant legal actors in a
58
hybrid system)."
As we have shown, there are serious issues with the efficiency of the
common law hypothesis, beginning with the definition of common law
and extending through its efforts to articulate a mechanism through
which the common law would reach efficient results. As a result, the efficiency hypothesis does not provide a sufficient framework to support
the claims of the legal origins literature. Moreover, even if the efficiency
hypothesis proved correct and the common law was found to be more efficient and/or more conducive to economic growth, the question of how
to move from one system to the other remains largely unaddressed. Le156. See discussion and examples by Garoupa & G6mez, supra note 2.
157. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci et al., The Dynamics of the Legal System, 79 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 95, 96 (2011) (explaining the relationship between high litigation rates and the balance between case law and legislation); Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 118 (predicting the progressive
convergence of common and civil law toward a mixed system); Carmine Guerriero, Democracy,Judicial Attitudes, and Heterogeneity: The Civil Versus Common Law Tradition 3 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law
& Econ. Working Paper No. 2010-10, 2010) (arguing that case law outperforms statute law when political institutions are weak).
158. Nuno Garoupa & Carlos G6mez Ligoerre, The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle
of Mixed Legal Families, Wis. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
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gal culture, rent-seeking, and the loss of accumulated human capital impose costs for such transplantation, particularly if the alternatives are
simply wholesale replacement of one system with another. "9 The available evidence suggests reasons to be skeptical that such large-scale reforms can succeed. 160
The problems with the efficiency literature that we identify above
suggest a need to identify specific features within legal systems that produce tendencies toward (or away from) efficiency. Identifying these features requires paying close attention to how actual implementations of
legal systems operate. The nineteenth-century American codification
debate provides a useful means to do so, since the participants were primarily drawn from the ranks of experienced lawyers and the debate included detailed disagreements over specifics. We now turn to the insights from that debate.
III.

INSIGHTS FROM THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN DEBATE

Engaging some of the best legal minds in the United States, proponents and opponents of codification debated the relative merits of common law and civil codes during the course of the nineteenth century.
While not conducted by economists, these debates were conducted by
people intimately familiar with the day-to-day practice of law within a
common-law system much less affected by statutory measures than any
American jurisdiction today. The participants were also often widely
read in European legal literatures and familiar from first-hand experience with European legal systems.' 6' They included James Coolidge
Carter, F.R. Coudert, David Dudley Field, Stephen Field, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Hugh Legare, Leland Stanford, John Norton Pomeroy,
and Joseph Story.162 Although they did not use explicit economic language in their debates, what modern analysts would label efficiency concerns underlay much of their debate. As a result, by examining their arguments and areas of disagreement, we can gain insights into the features
of both systems that influence the efficiency of the substantive rules produced.
The debate turned on claims by both sides about the virtues of their
preferred systems and the problems presented by the other. Both sides
made important claims about the gains possible from adopting or retaining their preferred legal system that we would recognize today as related
159.

See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, A Strategic Interpretationof Legal Transplants, 35

J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2006); see also Rubin, supra note 45.

160.

See Rubin, supra note 45, at 2.

161. See M. H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOAMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-11, 97 (1997); Lewis A. Grossman,

James Coolidge Carterand Mugwump Jurisprudence,20 LAW & HIST. REV. 577, 578 (2002); Stephen
N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an EarlierProcedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 315-16, 318 (1988).
162. Morriss, supra note 29.
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to efficiency. For example, code proponents frequently claimed that a
clear, well-organized code of laws would enable individuals to resolve
disputes without resort to attorneys.163 On the other hand, code opponents worried about codes' "inexhaustible capacities for mischief" by
producing litigation over their language."6 Although they did not use the
terminology, both were making arguments that the code would change
transaction costs.
The participants in this long-running debate did more than make
proto efficiency arguments without using economic terminology, however. They also focused on the features of the two systems that they believed affected the results, analyses that can be applied today to refine
the issues surrounding what produces efficient rules. Their debate went
beyond the substance of the rules within each system, focusing on the
mechanisms by which rules would be created and disseminated. 165 We
have identified three key areas relevant to the modern debate: uncertainty over the substance of the law, adaptability of the law to changed circumstances, and accessibility of the law. In this Section, we discuss the
arguments and map them into the modern debate over the common law's
efficiency.
A.

Uncertainty

The efficiency of the common law literature generally focuses on
the substance of the rules and rarely addresses the transaction costs imposed by the means of determining which legal rules govern a particular
situation. For people seeking legal advice, these costs are important
ones, and the codification debate included considerable discussion over
whether a civil code or the common law was superior in this respect.
Particularly in societies where legal resources are scarce and costly, this
factor should play a major role in determining the legal system's impact
on economic growth. As Hernando de Soto documented, when formal
legal systems are too costly for people to access, the lack of access to
them can be a major hindrance to economic growth. 166 In fact, according
to de Soto, the ability to access a formal legal system at low cost is a key
feature of successful economies.'67
163. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Debating the Field Civil Code 105 Years Late, 61 MONT. L. REV.
371, 373 (2000).
164. CARTER, ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION, supra note 30, at 21: see also id. at 25 (arguing that the
California Civil Code "is so vague, that the meaning of it cannot be intelligently arrived at until it has
passed through the crucible of the courts in the shape of a lawsuit from the highest to the lowest").
165. There were also disputes over specific provisions. See, e.g., ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C.,
supra note 7, at 6-22 (criticizing a wide range of specific provisions); ROBINSON, Veto, supra note 29,
at 74 (citing as grounds for veto a change in adoption law); A. G. SEDGWICK, DAMAGES IN THE CODE
(1885) (critiquing damages provisions); Charles M. Platt, The Proposed Civil Code of New York, 20
AM. L. REV. 713, 715-16 (1886) (criticizing organization of the Law of Persons section).
166.

HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD

WORLD 151-52 (June Abbot trans., 1989).
167. See id. at 250-52.
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The critics of the common law pointed to the scattering of legal
rules among cases in a multitude of sources, often available only in specialized library collections accessible only to members of the bar."6 For
example, an 1887 editorial in the procodification Albany Law Journal
termed the common law "obscure, contradictory, inconveniently scat'
tered and fluctuating."169
Similarly, code proponents pointed to the un-

certainty created by the reception of British common law in the United
States, since it was unclear which British cases still applied."' Suggesting
one solution to that problem, Jeremy Bentham urged Americans to "shut
your ports
against our common law, as you would shut them against the
171
plague.1
It was not just difficult to find the relevant rules, however. The
"contradictory and confusing" reports of cases were "frequently made to
prove more or less according to the inductive skill of the contender," to
the disadvantage of clients "in the hands of a defective or careless legal
logician."'' 2 Code proponents argued that these problems were inherent
in the common law's reliance on case law to articulate rules, which they
contended was an "incalculable evil" that "makes it impossible for individuals so to conduct their life or their business as to be secure against
unconscious violation of the law on the one hand, and the incurring of
unknown liabilities and responsibilities on the other."'73 To illustrate the
scope of the problem, David Dudley Field compared the English Bills of
Exchange Act to the common law, quoting the Act's author that he had
168. Field, supra note 27, at 240-41. By the 1970s, specialization's impact was seen as a positive,
allowing lawyers to focus on just the cases that were relevant to their practice. See Jacobstein, supra
note 97, at 795-96 (noting growth of specialized reporters allowing many lawyers to ignore expansion
of case law in general reporters).
169. Current Topics, 35 ALB. L.J. 81, 82 (Jan. 29, 1887); see also John F. Dillon, Codification, 20
AM. L. REV. 29, 36 (1886) (calling for codification to free society from "chaotic, uncertain, obscure,
and abounding in subtleties and refinements," the "remaining vestiges of the bondage of the Norman
Conqueror"). Similarly, Montana codifier Decius Wade summarized the common law as
decisions contradictory and irreconcilable; decisions overruling, modifying, limiting or enlarging
other decisions; right decisions supported by wrong reasons, and wrong decisions supported by
good reasons, by technicalities, or by no reasons at all; verbose and involved decisions, obscured
by obiter dicta and speculative theories; broad and learned decisions, and narrow and ignorant
ones; and decisions that decide the same thing over and over again.
Wade, supra note 143, at 410. This argument was related to similar ones made for the adoption of the
Code Napoldon in France, where "[p]eople complained quite commonly that the law [prior to the
Code] was so confused that nobody, including the judges, was able to know it with certainty, and that
they were at the mercy of the courts." Tunc, supra note 143, at 19.
170.

ROBT. LUDLOW FOWLER, CODIFICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 44 (Albany, Weed,

Parsons & Co. 1884) ("Now how far the English law of the eighteenth century is suited to colonial
conditions is one of the most perplexing problems with which the American judicatories have to
deal.").
171. JEREMY BENTHAM, Papers Relative to Codification and Public Instruction, in 4 THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 451, 504 (Edinburgh, William Tait 1843).
172. FOWLER, supra note 170, at 49.

173.

Edmond Kelly, Codification,20 AM. L. REV. 7, 9 (1886). Some claimed that this uncertainty

deterred analysis because under the common law, the constant fear that the law would change and
"consign the monuments of his industry to the hieroglyphic and undecypherable [sicI cenotaphs of
unknown times" kept the best lawyers from writing legal texts. The Civil Code of the State of New
York, No. I., Relations of Case Law to A Code, 2 ALB. L.J. 408, 409 (Nov. 19,1870).
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looked at 17 English statutes, 2000 English decisions, and an American
treatise citing 7000 decisions in the course of drafting one hundred sec-

tions of statutory language. 74 Because it would reduce vast libraries of
conflicting and hard-to-access case law to a single, organized body of
rules, code proponents argued in effect that codes would reduce these

significant transaction costs.175
A code would produce certainty in the place of the confusion
caused by the "precedents [which] may generally be found on both sides
of the question" 17 6 by reducing the law to a well-organized, clearly stated
body of principles in which these conflicts had been resolved. 7 7 California codifier Charles Lindley saw this as a key advantage, arguing that
codification would result in "[g]athering together and arranging in logical

order the fragmentary elements of a legal system, the reorganization and
re-expression of a body of laws for a people," which he claimed would be

''an event that can have no parallel in magnitude in the history of that

people.' 178 The creation of a body of well-organized law was certainly
part of the appeal of codification to the Dakota Territory legislators who
adopted Field's 1865 draft for New York "almost verbatim" in 1866,179 as
it generated a systematic body of law without the problems of distilling it
from outside precedents.
Even some common-law partisans conceded there was a problem
with the volume of case law, as when Charles Platt agreed that "our substantive law has become a vast, disordered mass" while denying that the
draft New York code solved this problem.18 Indeed, complaints about

174. Field, supra note 102, at 10-11.
175. FOWLER, supra note 170, at 52 (arguing that a code "will enable us to remove the enormities
of the case-law").
176. Wade, supra note 143, at 411.
177. Dillon, supra note 169, at 45 (code is arranged "in a definite and systematic form"); Field,
supra note 102, at 6 ("Collection and arrangement are the essential ideas; the rest are incidental.");
Wade, supra note 143, at 419-20 ("[T]o make such statute useful to judge, lawyer and people, there
must be orderly system and arrangement as to subjects, sub-divisions, and sections ...."). Story conceded as much in his analysis of the merits of codification. A code
will show, what the existing law is, as far as it goes, in a clear and intelligible manner. It will have
a tendency to suppress useless and expensive litigation. It will greatly abridge the labors of judges, as well as of the profession, by furnishing a starting point for future discussions, instead of imposing the necessity of constant researches through all the past annals of the law.
STORY, supra note 19, at 726. The organizational structure did not survive everywhere. The Dakotas
eventually dispensed with their code structures, alphabetizing the provisions. See Fisch, supra note 32,
at 51-52.
178.
CHARLES LINDLEY, CALIFORNIA CODE COMMENTARIES app. at v (1872).
179. Fisch, supra note 32. at 37. Fisch describes the adoption by the five-year-old territory "still
consisting of a few scattered settlements on the fringes of a vast Indian-swept, fort-flecked wilderness."
Fisch, supra note 80, at 485. Sheldon Amos criticized the Field drafts for New York as possibly fit for
"a new and undeveloped country" because of their "verbal simplicity" suitable for "a restlessly energetic and commercial community" but not for England, a nation which required "precision and accuracy of expression." AMOS, ENGLISH CODE, supra note 35, at 107-08.
180. Platt, supra note 165, at 717; see also MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 21 ("The uncertainty of the
law is proverbial.").
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the number of opinions are a constant feature of the U.S. legal system. '
Common-law partisans agreed that the volume of cases meant that
"many points, which, though on the whole now established by a considerable weight of judicial authority, are not absolutely beyond the reach
of forensic controversy, if learned counsel should choose to stir them." tl
They minimized the problem, however, noting that it was "necessary to
consult but a small part" of the total number of law books to learn the
law on most points."83
This debate identifies two important points that can be generalized.
First, ascertaining the relevant legal rules governing a transaction is a
cost for those seeking to engage in transactions. Legal systems differ
with respect to the degree of these costs, but we are skeptical that these
costs are correlated with common-law or civil-law origins. We suspect
that it is much more important whether a system focuses on enforcing the
intentions of the parties to transactions,"' providing clear default rules
for when those intentions cannot be ascertained, 85 and avoiding circumstances under which government officials can override private parties'

ordering of their transactions.'
Second, there are both costs and benefits to having multiple sources
of authority. Legal systems with a clear, well-known, limited hierarchy of
sources of legal authority (e.g., code systems) reduce the costs of identifying the relevant authorities. Legal systems with a diverse or diffuse set
of sources of authorities increase those costs. At the same time, a more
diverse set of authorities can increase the chances of finding a solution to
a particular problem that suits the facts of the particular case. Moreover,
181. See, e.g., Black, supra note 97, at 477-78 (listing complaints from 1671 forward); Field, supra
note 102, at 25 ("A code would mitigate the prevailing evil of long dissertations in the shape of opinions."); Jacobstein, supra note 97, at 791-93 (summarizing complaints from 1777 through 1970s that
"the growing number of published court opinions is threatening to destroy our system of American
jurisprudence"); Justice John D. Martin, The Problem of Reducing the Volume of Published Opinions,
26 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 138, 138 (1943) ("The lawyers are praying for general relief from the
ever increasing landslide of published opinions."); Eugene M. Prince, Law Books, Unlimited, 48
A.B.A. J. 134, 134 (1962) (estimating the number of American printed judicial opinions at 2.25 million,
up from 50,000 produced between 1790-1840); Hon. Samuel H. Sibley, The Multitude of Published
Opinions,25 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 166, 166 (1941-42) ("The bar and other courts ought not to be
afflicted with the growing multitude of published opinions."); Wade, supra note 143, at 419 ("Surely,
of the making of law books there is no end."); Warren, supra note 109, at 472-73 (calculating that
Harvard Law Library added 175,000 pages of opinions during the year ending June 30, 1915); Francis
P. Whitehair, Some Suggestions for the Elimination or Reduction of Publication of Unnecessary Opinions, 21 FLA. L.J. 225. 227 (1947) (estimating a minimum library size at 3200 volumes and 530 linear
feet); John B. Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 ILL. L. REV. 157. 158-59 (1915) (noting
more than 65,000 opinions from the federal and state courts of last resort added from 1909-1913 and
complaining that "[e]ven at the present time the volume of case law has become a burden"); see also
ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., supra note 99, at 5-6 (discussing "evil" of "great increase" in reported
cases).

182. STORY. supra note 19, at 724.
183. CARTER, WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN, supra note 30, at 21.
184. See Hayek, supra note 31, at 101-02.
185. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87.87 (1989).
186. HAYEK, supra note 31, at 104-05.
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a diverse pool of potential authorities reduces the constraints imposed by
any particular authority on a decision maker, a potential cost. This
tradeoff, between the benefits of finding particular outcomes that suit a
set of facts and the costs of doing so, and the degree of restraint imposed
on a decision maker, may be made differently in different societies at different times. It also maps poorly onto civil and common law, categories
that are better represented by the overlapping circles of a Venn diagram
than by completely separate spheres. As we described earlier, civil-law
systems differ significantly in their attention to judicial opinions in earlier
cases, treatises, and other sources. Similarly, common-law systems differ
in their respect for precedent from outside the jurisdiction, secondary
sources, and their own precedents.
Code proponents identify a third source of uncertainty in the common law: judges' ability to change it. For example, a procodification editorial in the New York Times relayed an anecdote in which "an earnest
debate over a decision occurred between two Judges, one of whom said
to the other, 'I tell you this is the law,' and the other replied, 'It may be
the law now, but it will not be the law after this case is decided."" 7 Similarly, David Dudley Field told an audience at a speech that "[s]ome of us
have heard this dialogue between counsel and judge: 'There is no precedent for this,' says the former. 'Then I will make a precedent,' says the
latter.' '1 8 A code would solve these problems, they argue, since judges
could not create a new rule "if the old rule was written down in a statute,
' 9
instead of an opinion.'"
Anticode advocates retorted that the process of codification is more
error prone than the common law's decision-making process. As a result, they contended that proposed codes often misstated or misunderstood the law, pointing to "cartloads of errors and uncertainties" in specific proposed codes.' 90 More generally, they argued that statutes could
not deal with "the infinite variety of the conditions which different cases
present."' 191 Simply stating general principles was insufficient to reduce
uncertainty, since those principles were widely recognized and it was
their application that was crucial.'9 The common law, on the other hand,
187. Editorial, Common Law Fetichism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1886. at 4 (quoting a report from
the American Bar Association) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Field, supra note 102, at 22.
189. William Reinecke, Codification, 5 KY. L. REP. & J. 867.869 (1884).
190. CARTER, ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION, supra note 30, at 25: see also CARTER, PROPOSED
CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 82 (describing codes' "necessary introduction into the law of a great
mass of error").
191. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 21; see also CARTER, WRI-rEN AND
UNWRITTEN, supra note 30, at 39 (explaining that statutes would lead to "the employment of the subtle arts of interpretation, and the obvious meaning of the language is expounded away in favor of the

interests of justice").
192.

See, e.g., CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 102 (arguing that proposed

code sections on the law of general average accomplished little "for these eight Sections are occupied
wholly with a statement of rules of the most general character, concerning which there is not, and for
half a century has not been, either doubt or question"). The report went on to charge that "four in-
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offered "the examples of the decided cases, the precedents illustrating
and applying these general principles" to enable people to better predict
the outcome of applying principles.'93 The process of reducing the law to
a code would thus produce uncertainty: the law addressed "the vastness
and complexity" of human affairs, and reducing the common law to a
code would make94 it "artificial and arbitrary" instead of relying on
"common sense."'
Further, the process of codification was insufficiently transparent, with code bills being considered too quickly to allow for
thorough evaluation.'95
Code opponents claimed that changes to a code would introduce
new problems of interpretation rather than resolving issues. New York
anticode campaigners pointed to California law professor John Norton
Pomeroy's analysis of the California codes as evidence of how introducing a written code created uncertainty, reprinting as pamphlets his articles on interpretation under the codes in which Pomeroy had claimed
that "[tihere is hardly a section, whether it embodies only a definition, or
whether it contains the utterance of some broad principle, or some general doctrine, or some single special rule, which does not require to be
judicially interpreted" to illustrate the point. 16
stances of doubtful and ambiguous meaning, involving future strife and litigation, and four other instances of positive error" in these eight sections would import "doubt, uncertainty and error" into "a
branch of the law where everything is now certain and clear." Id. at 108.
193. CLARKE, supra note 127, at 209.
194.

JOHN R. STRONG, AN ANALYSIS OF THE REPLY OF MR. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD TO THE BAR

ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 8-9 (1881); see also CLARKE, supra note 127, at 209 ("[A]s
soon as the Codifier descends from glittering generalities to the enumeration of earmarks of classification to fit special instances, what is gained in definiteness is lost in equity.").
195. See, e.g., ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 5 (expressing surprise at "how many members of the Legislature (although apparently ignorant of the character of the proposed Code) were yet inclined to relieve that Body from the pertinacious vitality of
that measure by voting in its favor, as the only apparently available method of achieving that desirable
end."); ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE "To URGE THE
REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE;" APPOINTED MARCH 15TH, 1881, at 5 (Oct. 21, 1881)
[hereinafter ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., MARCH 15TH REPORT] ("The result of many inquiries was
an inability to find any member of the [New York] Assembly who was willing to acknowledge that he
had read [the proposed Civil Code], although one member did frankly confess that he had himself voted for it, in order to rid the Assembly of its presence as an element of disturbance."); CARTER,
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION, supra note 30, at 13 (noting no one in legislature had likely "carefully
read" the entire proposed code); CORNELL, supra note 29, at 8-9 (arguing that it was inappropriate to
pass Code knowing of defects, in reliance on future corrections); ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 73 (justifying the veto of a bill of "nearly four hundred closely printed pages" that both houses had passed
"within two hours of a single day" as being insufficiently vetted). Montana's hasty adoption also
brought with it problems, as the discovery after adoption of numerous changes in existing law demonstrated. See Morriss, supra note 25. at 386-409 (discussing haste and post-adoption issues). The speed
of adoption was also an issue in California. See Kleps, supra note 20, at 774 (discussing Charles Lindley's complaints about rushed process). This was seen as a wider problem with legislation during the
late nineteenth century. See, e.g., ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., REPORT ON A PLAN FOR IMPROVING
THE METHODS OF LEGISLATION OF THIS STATE 15 (1885) (quoting governor in 1885: "One of the
greatest evils incident to the hasty methods of modern legislation is the careless and imperfect manner
in which bills are generally framed.").
196. See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, THE "CIVIL CODE" IN CALIFORNIA 6 (San Francisco,
Boncroft & Co. 1884); see also ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., MARCH 15TH REPORT, supra note 195, at
8 ("When we remember the conflicts of authority that have arisen in the past over necessary legislative
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The common law's defenders argued that code provisions made the
law uncertain because they were written at a high level of generality (and
not necessarily using a simple and clear language). One California lawyer was "inclined to think that much of the instability which appears to
be a constant accompaniment of 'codification' ... is due to the attempt to
'
legislate in popular language on subjects essentially technical."197
If written at a general level, a code could never absorb all of the detail necessary to sufficiently specify the law.19 But if written at a sufficiently detailed level, Story hypothesized that a code comprehending all of the
common law "would be of such vast size and accumulated materials, that
it would serve to perplex rather than to clear away difficulties, and would
import into the administration of justice more mischiefs and doubts, and
'
stimulants to litigation, than it could hope to remedy."199
Even a statute
clear on its face would be subject to lawyers' efforts to twist it to suit
their clients' needs.
The ingenuity of lawyers would be employed to show that the statute could not have been designed, and therefore should not be construed, to embrace such cases, and, though they might seem, upon a
hasty and superficial interpretation, to be covered by the language
employed, yet that such interpretation must be discarded in favor of
one more agreeable to justice."w

remodelling of a few well settled rules of law, the mind shrinks appalled at the prospect of the interminably protracted war of uncertainty, inevitably involved in this colossal experiment of uprooting the
landmarks of the law of the land."); ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE "To URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE;" REAPPOINTED NOVEMBER
1, 1881 at 10 (1882) [hereinafter ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., NOVEMBER 1 REPORT] ("It is confidently believed that while [the proposed code] would inevitably multiply doubt, uncertainty, and consequent litigation to an extent difficult to estimate, it would not settle any dispute that the text-books
and adjudicated cases now leave open."); CLARKE, supra note 127, at 197 ("[A] great mass of absolutely certain law under the common law system becomes a Province of new law to be reinvestigated
and decided afresh under the code system."); MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 23 (arguing that one would
have to rely on the same materials used to create a code to understand it). The use of Pomeroy's articles is described in CARTER, ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION, supra note 30, at 23-25; CARTER. WRITTEN
AND UNWRITTEN, supra note 30, at 24-25. The New York anticode activists also pointed out that the
proposed Civil Code altered the language of many statutory provisions. ARGUMENTS AGAINST, supra
note 26, at 11 (noting 391 sections were based on New York statutes and only two were identical to the
statutes).
197. John T. Doyle, Copy Second Letter of John T. Doyle, May 28, 1882, reprinted in ASS'N OF
THE BAR OF N.Y.C., NOVEMBER 1 REPORT, supra note 196, at 28, 29: see also MATHEWS, supra note
28, at 8 ("[N]ot everything of common interest is susceptible of such simplification."); ARGUMENTS
AGAINST, supra note 26, at 3 (noting argument that "business transactions constantly taking place
were not simple and no man could make them simple" and so a code could not simplify).
198. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. HORNBLOWER, CORPORATIONS UNDER THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE
18 (1888) (using the California experience to argue that courts would "notwithstanding the Code, first
examine the history of adjudicated cases and then refer to the Code to see its bearing upon these decisions").
199. STORY, supra note 19, at 711; see also MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 14 ("Itmight be comparatively easy to lay down a few simple abstract rules, but so soon as the law-giver descended to particulars, in the absence of concrete facts to guide his judgment, the laws of his imaginary empire would be,
necessarily, either tyranical or abortive.").
200. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 15; see also MATHEWS, supra note 28,
at 27.
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This process made the law uncertain, as a statute "extended beyond its
appropriate province" by a judge's interpretation "produces the very uncertainty which it was designed to avoid."20 1
Once again, this identifies an important dimension upon which legal
systems differ. General rules have important virtues, including restricting rent-seeking and making the law adaptable.2" More specific rules
may reduce uncertainty in certain cases-whether articulated in case law
or code provisions -while creating ambiguity in cases where no specific
provision is immediately applicable. Much will depend on how legal authorities treat gaps in the system of rules; an attitude of "everything not
explicitly permitted is forbidden" is quite different from one of "everything not forbidden is allowed." Again, these differences map poorly onto the common-law and civil-law dichotomy.
As we have described, both pro- and anti-code partisans identified
important issues involving transaction costs of the legal system,0 3 even if
they tended to be blind to the defects of their preferred system. Crucially, under any system, some disputes will be readily settled by resort to esand there will also be cases on the
tablished, readily located legal rules2 11"
margin where the parties disagree on the appropriate rule ex ante. An
important question about the efficiency of a legal system concerns the
number of marginal cases that occur under the various forms of organization.
The virtues each group identifies in their own preferred systems reveal important transaction costs issues. Code proponents are correct that
code systems provide well-organized and authoritative statements of legal principles, which are cheaper to identify than the relevant case authority in many instances. Code proponents are also correct that common-law systems do not provide the same sort of well-organized and
authoritative statements of principles, although there are nonauthoritative sources that attempt to reduce this uncertainty, 25 and there are poorly organized and authoritative statements of legal principles in the form
of judicial opinionst 6 Common-law proponents are correct that the
201.

CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION. supra note 30, at 15.

202. HAYEK, supra note 31. at 74.
203. CLARKE, supra note 127, at 196-97, 265-66 ("All admit that there are grave defects of uncertainty and obscurity in the English law; and all admit similar defects in the law of all countries having
Codes. Whether the amount of certainty in administration -in other words, the power of predictionis as great under one system, as under the other, is a question on which authorities differ.").
204. As code proponent Robert Fowler argued. "The administration of law is always in the main
a struggle to include the contested case within a certain law, whether that law has emanated from the
superior legislative body, or from the inferior legislative body-the judiciary." FOWLER, supra note
170, at 13.
205. Some commentators suggested that the Restatement serves a similar function to a code in
unifying and rationalizing the law. See, e.g., Ren6 Cassin. Codification and National Unity, in THE
CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 7, at 46,52.

206. To take one particularly dramatic example, consider the exception to the employment-at-will
rule created by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company, 316 A.2d 549
(N.H. 1974). As set out in Monge, and interpreted by virtually everyone thereafter, the exception was an
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mass of precedent offer the potential for guidance in more situations
than a general statement of a principle in a code (and not unusually in a
complex legal language). Most importantly, the source of uncertainty in
each system arises out of different sources. In a code system, it comes
from disagreements over which of the potentially competing, clearly stated principles will govern a particular dispute.2" 7 In a common-law system,
it comes from disagreements over which precedents apply to a particular
dispute. What both the nineteenth-century debaters and today's legal origins literature miss is that they reflect a continuum across both families
of legal systems.
The disagreements over uncertainty also identify a second important area in which to compare legal systems. Common-law proponents are correct that common-law systems produce their statements of
authority when disputes arise, potentially faster than a code revision or
legislative process could provide new principles for new problems under
a code- or statute-based system. This ability, however, also imposes uncertainty costs since some of the uncertainty in the common-law system
comes from disagreements over how to fill gaps in the law,208 whether a
precedent should be overturned,2 °" or which precedents govern.2 10 Code
proponents are correct that the thoroughness of a code offers the possibility of resolving disputes in advance of actual disagreements. Finally,
both identify opportunities for errors by courts and lawyers to increase
21
uncertainty; legal systems likely differ in how often such errors occur. 1
B.

Adaptability

Preventing uncertainty requires stable rules. But legal systems must
also adapt to changed circumstances to remain efficient, as our earlier
discussion of multiple equilibria suggests. This requires granting courts a
extremely broad establishment of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied to employment law. In Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980), however, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court radically rewrote the rule to be a narrower public policy exception, while claiming it
had not made a change in the law. See Bergeron v. Travelers Ins. Co., 480 A.2d 42, 42 (N.H. 1980)
(noting that Dorr"clarified and construed" Monge and "did not create a new rule of law or significantly depart from Monge").
207. STEINER, supra note 143 (discussing sources of law).
208. For example, in Pennsylvania between 1959 and the early 1980s, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court paid little attention to the employment-at-will rule. Federal district courts hearing cases in the
state created a body of common law addressing the issue, which proved an inaccurate forecast of what
Pennsylvania state courts later decided. See Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts
in Changing State Law: The Employment at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 253
(1984) (discussing thirty-seven federal district court opinions).
209. See supra note 113.
210. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (showing disagreement
between Judges Posner and Easterbrook over whether a case presented an issue of employment law or
corporate law); see also J. Mark Ramseyer, Not-So-OrdinaryJudges in Ordinary Courts: Teaching Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1209 (2007) (noting that the case demonstrates
that "many cases are simply beyond the capacity of most real-world courts to handle cost-effectively").
211. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson. Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MoNT. L. REV. 17, 5587 (1990) (describing how Montana courts created problems by erroneously ignoring code language).
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degree of discretion.212 As a result, the cost of adapting to new circumstances should be a consideration in assessing the overall efficiency of a
legal system, particularly to the extent that economic growth itself
changes the efficient choice. Advocates of the common law identified its
adaptability as a significant advantage derived from its incremental ap214
proach.21 They argued that courts lay down rules "provisionallyonly
while codes and statutes, based on an understanding of potential issues
before they occurred, produced fixed rules that might miss important distinctions. As Joseph Story noted, "[t]he principles of law, which might
suffice for the ordinary transactions of one age, would be wholly insufficient to answer the exigencies of the next age. ''21 By incrementally deciding which cases belonged within a particular rule, the common law
was able to postpone drawing distinctions until it had the necessary facts
to decide which distinctions were relevant. 16 Common-law partisans believe that codes and statutes set out fixed categories that left little room
for such adjustments except by amendment.2 7 Of course, another name
for adaptability might be uncertainty. Common-law proponents claimed
that this adaptability was not the indeterminacy with which the critics
charged the common law, largely because they believed that the existing
judges' choices
common law restrained judicial innovation, restricting
21
through the need to harmonize with prior decisions. 1
212. Sereni, supra note 9, at 69.
213. See, e.g., MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 14 ("By a natural process, as from an oft-repeated application of a principle of justice, morals, or policy to varying facts, such principle is found capable of
being expressed in the same or similar language, the unwritten law always steadily progresses toward
such self-codification.").
214. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 25, 32 ("The essential nature of classification consists in selecting qualities of objects, and declaring that all which possess such qualities,
whatever others they may exhibit, belong to the class. When, therefore, any case arises for disposition
under a Code, if it present the features belonging to a class created by it, it must be dealt with the same
as other instances in that class, no matter what additional and theretofore unknown features it may
present which ought to subject, and would have subjected. it to a wholly different disposition, had the
new features been present to the mind of the codifier.").
215. STORY, supra note 19, at 708.
216.

See Remonstrance of June, 1882, in ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., NOVEMBER 1 REPORT,

supra note 196, at 20, 21 (arguing that the common law's "distinguishing feature has been that it is
never declared apart from the actual facts out of which the questions grow which are to be decided,
and it is so declared by learned and skilled tribunals, after discussion by a learned Bar; not by popular
legislative bodies, incapable of that cautious deliberation which is absolutely essential to the determination of truth"); MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 16 (describing incremental process as an advantage);
CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 86 (arguing that codification would cause "the
arrestof the self-development of private law").
217. See, e.g., MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 17 ("[W]hen that rule is to be found only in the Procrustean Bed of a written Code, the letter of the statute must prevail over any fitting modification of
that rule which unforseen circumstances may come to require, and justice may be thus surely defeated."). One later analyst noted that opposition to Field's New York drafts focused on "attempts to liberalize some of what we would now generally agree were the inequities and rigidities of the common
law of that day." Fisch, supra note 32, at 17.
218. MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 37 (noting that common law "can not be created by the fiat of
an autocrat"); CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 8 ("The equality of all men before the law, the harmonious blending of law and liberty, the learned, independent, and uncorrupt judiciary, are all the fruits, in large measure, of the free and natural method of growth under which our
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Codes, on the other hand, required constant adjustment. This
meant that codes' apparent stability would ultimately prove illusory because of "the immense amount of amendment which they invariably entailed, and of the methods in which amendments were invariably0
'22
made."2 19 As a result, "[c]odes were peculiarly uncertain and unstable.
Some code proponents agreed that some degree of elasticity in the

law was a virtue.22 ' They believed, however, that the supporters of the

common law mistook obscurity for elasticity. What the common law really provided, they argued, was the "doubt and uncertainty that comes
from contradictory or obscure decisions. ' 222 If those principles were discernible, they would "be none the less elastic or comprehensive" if reduced to a statute "from time to time. ' 223 Even a code skeptic like Story
argued that codification need not reduce this important advantage of the
jurisprudence has become what it is."); CARTER, WRI-r-EN AND UNWRITTEN, supra note 30, at 13 (describing the role of judge as limited by "[tlhe fabric of the national law" which is "a vast system of
rules" set out in opinions). Somewhat paradoxically, they claimed that the common law was simultaneously more stable and more elastic than statutes. See CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra
note 30, at 83 ("Next to absolute right, stability is the chief excellence in jurisprudence.").
219. ARGUMENTS AGAINST, supra note 26, at 12; see also CLARKE, supra note 127, at 292-93 ("In
France the code is buried under a heap of subsequent enactments of the Legislature and of the judiciary law subsequently introduced by the tribunals. In Prussia the mass of new Laws and authoritative
interpretations which have been introduced subsequently to the promulgation of the code, is many
times the size of the code itself."); CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 68 (stating
that codes would require constant amendment); CARTER, ARGUMENT ...
IN OPPOSITION, supra note
30, at 5-6. New York had extensive experience with a high volume of legislation during the 1870s and
1880s. See ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., REPORT ON A PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE METHODS OF
LEGISLATION OF THIS STATE 3 (1885) (finding more than 600 amendments in 1874 and 550 in 1884).
Much of this was special interest legislation. Id. at 4 ("[I]t is safe to say that one-half of the changes in
the general law are moved and brought about by some special or personal interest and with the specific purpose to meet a special case."). The prediction of numerous amendments proved correct in the
case of Montana. Morriss, supra note 25, at 409-17, 443-50.
220. ARGUMENTS AGAINST, supra note 26, at 12; see also CARTER, ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION,
supra note 30, at 18 (quoting Sheldon Amos arguing that "[tihe greatest possible uncertainty and vacillation that have ever been charged against English law are little more than insignificant aberrations
when compared with what a French advocate has to prepare himself for when called upon to advise a
client."). A California lawyer wrote to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, urging
rejection of the proposed New York Civil Code on the basis of his experience with California's Civil
Code. As an example, he noted a case where a code provision was amended to change a rule of property law, "undoubtedly a case in which facility of amendment operated as a temptation to it." John T.
Doyle, Extracts from Letter of John T. Doyle, April 22, 1882, reprinted in ASS'N OF THE BAR OF
N.Y.C., NOVEMBER 1 REPORT, supra note 196, at 24, 26.
221. See, e.g.. ARGUMENTS AGAINST, supra note 26, at 3 (reporting that N.C. Moak "was opposed
to establishing a hard and unyielding system of law in place of the elasticity of the common law"). A
few code proponents saw little need for further legal developments. Montana's Decius Wade, for example, argued that "[i]n this age of the world the discovery of new principles of law is rare, but there is
a constant application of old principles to new facts and conditions." Decius S. Wade, The Bench and
Bar 1880-1884, in JOAQUIN MILLER, AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 634,

670 (1894). Similarly, Field saw English codifiers as "seeking... a more useful form into which to cast
a legal system whose substance is at least generally settled." Fisch,supra note 32, at 13.
222. Wade, supra note 143, at 413.
223. Id. at 414. Story also conceded that allowing disputes over the "many nice distinctions and
differences, and many incidental dicta which serve greatly to perplex the inquiries of the ablest lawyers" might be resolved more quickly by "four or five lines of text in a code, stating the true general
rule, deducible from the best of them," which "would have at once put aside the necessity of any further consideration of most of these cases." STORY, supra note 19, at 724-25.
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common law "to a hard and unyielding" character if proper rules of interpretation were included.224 Similarly, a codification advocate contended that interpretation would provide the common law's adaptability
within a code system:
[T]he judicial operations do not change: with a fearless bar and an
intelligent judiciary, there will be in the future, as in the past, the
same effort to arrive at exact justice, the same effort to distinguish
the given case and possibly as great a proportion of error, though it
22 5
is thought not.
The most important difference between the two sides of the debate
is not about whether adaptability is valuable but over how the law should
adapt. 226 Code proponents vigorously contested the merits of the common-law process, often quoting Jeremy Bentham to make their point:
Do you know how Judges make the common law? ... Just as a man
makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to
break him of you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This
227
is the way the Judges make law for you and me.
Beneficial legal changes to handle changed circumstances came, code
proponents argued, from the legislative process rather than the common
law. As examples, they pointed to statutory changes in English law that
allowed the negotiability of notes and to the modification of the common
law to allow married women to own property in their own right. 2 8
Common-law partisans rejected this, seeing case law's gradual development as the better way to adjust the law to changed circumstances.
The adaptability discussion suggests an important dimension on
which the efficiency of legal systems should be assessed. The law must
adapt to new conditions by modifying the substance of rules quickly
enough to accommodate the changed conditions but not so quickly as to

224. STORY, supra note 19, at 720. In part, this disagreement reflects the unfamiliarity of the debate's participants with the day-to-day operation of code systems. As we noted earlier, interpretation
remains a key part of civil code legal systems, with the primary difference between civil code systems
and common-law systems resting on the former's lack of deference to precedent. See Tunc, supra note
143, at 27 (describing the "secondary place of the law made by judges and lawyers" in the French system).
225. FOWLER, supra note 170, at 13; see also Codes and Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1887, at 4
("When new cases arise common law Judges decide them upon legal analogies by a consideration of
the principles governing all cases nearest similar, and with due regard to the 'national standard of justice.' That is what the Code Napoleon directs Judges administering it to do, while the Prussian Code
directs new cases to be reserved for legislative action. As regards new cases codes are at no disadvantage, while as regards the immeasurably greater number of cases under old law they give advantages ....
").
226. Field, supra note 102, at 13 (conceding that a code could not answer all future questions).
227. See, e.g., Common Law Fetichism, supra note 187, at 4 (quoting Jeremy Bentham) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
228. Field, supra note 102, at 21 ("The careful student of history will find that from the time when
the English judges resisted the negotiability of the notes of merchants down to the hour when the last
shackle was stricken from the hands of woman in the holding of her own property and taking the fruit
of her own labor, the real and healthy growth of the law has proceeded not from the seats of judges,
but from the halls of legislative assemblies.").
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undermine the certainty of the law. Further, it must identify the right
adaptation and introduce it into the law. Assessing which system solves
this problem at the lowest cost is difficult. The answer depends in part
on the likelihood that cases not solved by existing bodies of law will arise.
One source of new problems is technological change, although not all
such changes require new legal principles-some can be addressed by
straightforward application of existing principles.229 Other sources of
change include changes in the economy, which create demands for new
forms of organization,230 new relationships among economic actors,23' and
means of accommodating new activities. 32
Common-law partisans argued that the common law has an advantage in adaptability by virtue of its continual opportunities for incremental change, as the evolutionary models of efficiency suggest. They
contended that precedent served as a guide, rather than an inflexible
"dictator" and so allowed the law to evolve. 33 But the mechanism by
which the common law would be guided to evolve in the right direction
sounds much like the models reviewed earlier. As in Richard Posner's
judicial preference model, common-law advocates argued that judges
apply a "social standard of justice" that they "know" and "feel... because they are a part of the community."2" Similar to the evolutionary
models, they also contended that the adversary process-with lawyers
"animated to the highest endeavors" by "a sense of duty, professional
ambition and pecuniary reward"-would lead to a "sound" determination of the result, superior to that possible in discussions among a group
of codifiers.3 5 This process was leading "the private law of all English
'
speaking States to a unity,"236
which suggests an affinity for the single
equilibrium theory.
Not only do these mechanisms require greater specificity in the dimensions we discussed earlier, they also risk undervaluing the role of interpretation within code systems, a dimension on which code systems differ. Moreover, the common law's advantages in this dimension (if any)

229. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207 (1996), with Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (debating the necessity of adapting legal principles to technolog-

ical change).
230. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership,26 J. CORP. L. 819 (2001) (describing the evolution of the LLC).
231. See generally Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 703 (1998) (describing evolution of landlord-tenant law).
232. See, e.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) (arguing that it
was "utterly impracticable" for landowners to "stake out, or assert claims to definite, unused spaces in
the air"); Mark de Figueiredo & Adeeb Fadil, Emerging Property and Liability Issues for Carbon Sequestration, BLOOMBERG FINANCE, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.stblaw.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=
4&itemlD=73&focused=762.
233. CARTER, WRITrEN AND UNWRITTEN, supra note 30, at 36.
234. Id. at 48.
235. Id. at 47.
236. Id. at 51.
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are potentially offset by its difficulties in easily correcting erroneous
changes, as some courts defer to legislatures to overturn rules based on
prior precedent. This brings us back to the issue of the impact of the differences of treatment of precedent across common-law systems, which
we discussed earlier.
Undoubtedly, the adaptability of a legal system to changed circumstances is a critical variable in assessing its contribution to economic
growth.2 37 But adaptability is not a characteristic limited to a single type
of legal system. The Code Napol6on's survival in France for over three
hundred years and through multiple constitutions is an impressive testament to its adaptability, as is the survival of the German 1896 Civil Code.
Moreover, adaptability represents just one dimension upon which to
evaluate legal systems and a dimension that, at least in part, represents a
tradeoff with uncertainty.
C.

Accessibility

The proponents of codification in nineteenth-century America argued that a code made law accessible to the general public while the
common law has hidden the rules "in [the] sealed books" of judicial opinions, accessible only to lawyers.238 For example, the New York Times
summed up the case for codification in 1888 as: "We can put the argument for the code into three words: 'Publish the law."'239 Moreover, the
code advocates also argued that not only was the law scattered across
statute books and court opinions, but the common law was written in a
format which nonlawyers could not understand.24 Under the common
law, code proponents argued:

237. See supra note 229.
238. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, Commission on Practice and Pleading, Final Report of the Practice
Commission, December 31, 1849 (1849), reprinted in 1 DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, SPEECHES,
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 291 (A.P. Sprague, ed., New

York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884).
239. A Reproach to the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1888, at 4. Story argued that this was necessary
for the criminal law. STORY, supra note 19, at 731 ("One of the most obvious dictates of reason is, that
public crimes, which are to affect every citizen, should, as far as practicable, be made known to all.").
Yet Britain proved unable to adopt any of its several efforts at criminal law codification during the
nineteenth century. See supra note 38; see also BENTHAM, supra note 60 ("[l]f the laws which concern
the whole community were comprised in a single volume ... if the general code were generally circulated; ...if an acquaintance with it was essential to the enjoyment of political rights: then indeed
would the law be truly known, every departure from it would be felt, and every citizen would constitute himself its guardian. It would no longer be wrapt in mystery; its exegesis would cease to be a monopoly; neither fraud nor chicane could evade it."). Napoleon made this one of his main goals in creating the Code Napoldon. Friedrich, snpra note 70, at 10-11. There are some claims that clearly
written codes increase popular understanding of the law. See Tunc, supra note 143, at 22 ("Those engaged in the practice of law in France are often surprised to see to what extent the law is known by
ordinary people, or at least the law of property by the owners of land and persons living in the country,
the laws of business by businessmen, and the law of the family by everybody.").
240. See Wade, supra note 143, at 2-3 (noting that people do not have necessary training to understand court opinions).
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Not only does the law when discovered often take the shape of a
sphinx riddle, but it is always set in the center of a labyrinth, the key
to which has to be laboriously sought and the mazes of it with painful perseverance worked out, before the weary searcher can know
whether he is to be rewarded by the revelation of a positive rule, or
241
only end in being baffled by a conundrum.
The result was that judges and lawyers "spend their lives in searching for
decisions that will determine the question in hand. 24 2 Reducing the
common law to clearly written principles-which would be necessary to
apply any law 24 3-and putting those principles into an organized framework, the codifiers argued, was the only way to make it accessible to
those who needed it. As a committee of the New York Chamber of
Commerce argued, "the law is meant for the affairs and business of men,
and that its general principles can be perfectly understood by the exercise of ordinary common sense."'2" Optimistically, the New York Times
editorialized that the proposed New York Civil Code was written "in a
manner so systematic, upon a scheme so comprehensive, and in language
so plain that the ordinary man can learn in half an hour nearly all that
the best counsel can tell him upon any question of law included within
it. 2 45
By contrast to this, the codifiers argued, the common law required
first searching a particular state supreme court's cases, then the "list of
'cases cited, criticized, and distinguished, or overruled,"' then the deci'
sions of lower courts, then "abroad into other States or across the sea."246
This required examining "volumes upon volumes.., with no other guide
than an index at the end of each volume, or a compilation or collection of
indexes called digests, of many volumes. '247 These digests were "made
sometimes by men of sense, and sometimes by men of no sense, without
'24 8
any agreement upon a plan or classification of subjects.
Code opponents were skeptical that that a code would produce a
broad, general understanding of the law. They agreed that organization
and arrangement could improve lay (and professional) understanding of

241.

Kelly, supra note 173. at 10.

242.
243.
244.

Wade, supra note 143, at 411.
FOWLER, supra note 170, at 51.
Current Topics, 33 ALB. L.J. 221, 282 (Mar. 20, 1886) (quoting a New York Chamber of

Commerce report) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245.

The Code-Here and Else Where, N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 28, 1885, at 4; see also Wade, supra note

143, at 420 (noting that "there must be orderly system and arrangement as to subjects, sub-divisions
and sections") (internal quotation marks omitted). California Governor Leland Stanford argued in
1863 that California's statutory output since 1849 was already so great that 'Citizens not versed by
constant familiarity with their contents, and desirous of investigating the laws, stand aghast as they
survey the fourteen ponderous tomes that constitute the statutes of this youthful state ....... Kleps,
supra note 20, at 769 (quoting Leland Stanford).
246.

David Dudley Field, Reasons for Codification, in THE LIFE

ed., 1964).
247. Id.
248.

Id.

OF THE LAW

114 (John Honnold
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the law but saw that as the function of treatises rather than codes.249
Moreover, they claimed that no Code could provide the clarity the codifiers claimed would result, for every lawyer knew that "the points upon
which he is now most frequently applied to for advice" concerned statutes, not the common law.2 10 Most importantly, however, the common
law's defenders argued that "positive legislation, however rapid and constant, can never keep up in any just proportion with the actual permutations and combinations of the business of an active, enterprising, and industrious people. ' 251 A code would need regular revisions, but those
revisions would have to wait while cases worked out "the proper remedy
or principle, which ought to be generally applied, could be clearly per2 52
ceived, or safely adopted. 1
Once again, both sides to the debate identified an important element in the efficiency of a legal system: the cost of access. Even with the
most efficient set of rules, a legal system that is not accessible to the people who wish to make use of it cannot promote growth, operating only
within a "bell jar," as Hernando de Soto argued. 3 But accessibility is
more than the ability to find a relevant passage in a reference work.
Lawyers in civil code countries are well paid, just as lawyers in commonlaw countries are,254 not because they have memorized lists of rules but
because they understand how to structure transactions within a framework of rules or to present facts and law to a decision maker in a fashion
which increases the likelihood of a favorable decision. Accessibility requires a legal system with sufficiently predictable outcomes that practitioners can provide meaningful advice and rules of sufficiently general
applicability that those planning their affairs need not worry that their
plans depend on the political connections of potential parties to a dispute
or transaction.
In addition, accessibility requires the ability to identify relevant legal rules. The structure of common-law court opinions render identifying the decisional rule difficult; much of the first year of American legal
education is taken up with efforts to teach students how to properly read
249. See, e.g., STRONG, supra note 194. at 9 (stating "I submit that the Legislature appoint a commission of eminent gentlemen of the bar to prepare systematic and simple statements or text books,"
rather than codify the law).
250.

CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 30, at 92; see also HORNBLOWER, supra note

198, at 19 (noting that Code sections would "require to be adjudicated on, construed, limited and explained, so as to bring it into harmony with subsisting rules of law and with the principles of justice and
equity. Innumerable questions will arise as to the meaning of particular phrases. on which astute
Courts will differ .... "); MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 27 ("[Sltatute law is the nursing mother of technicality."); STRONG, supra note 194, at 4 ("Can he say that these brief isolated formulae [in the code]
are of any use except to a lawyer who knows the relative position and bearings of the principle each
one is founded upon?").
251.
252.

STORY, supra note 19, at 7098.
Id. at 709.

253.

HERNANDO DE SOTO. THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 66 (2000).

254. See Nuno Garoupa, Providing a Framework for Reforming the Legal Profession: Insights
from the European Experience, 9 EUR. BuS. ORG. L. REV. 463, 480 (2008).

1492

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2012

decisions. 5 Codes, if not statutes generally, are easier to read but can
also be challenging to apply. Law school in civil-law countries involves
five years 256 (rather than the seven total required in the United States)
257
and code classes within that education are not simple.
A further dimension of accessibility is the degree to which legal systems decide cases according to known criteria. Even if one can decode
the written opinion, the reader may not be particularly close to understanding the court's decision process. Writing in 1961, a former state supreme court justice noted that opinions did not always reflect the reason
for the decision:
The reasons for the decision relied on in the conference may have
been neither fully developed nor expressed in terms of formal legal
principles or rules, but they were real reasons. The judge to whom
the case is assigned is then in effect told to make it look good. That
is an overstatement, because he is expected to be honest in what he
writes, and is expected to set forth the case accurately. But he is
expected to make the court's decision, or the majority's position,
look good. 8
Appellate judges agree to opinions for a variety of reasons, not necessarily related to the merits of the arguments made in the opinions:
Other judges, and sometimes the author of the opinion, may not
recognize its full import. If they do recognize the import they still
may not want to hurt [the author's] feelings by insisting on a change
that is not immediately urgent. It may just be too much trouble to
get the opinion rewritten. The case may have been poorly briefed,
and a crowded calendar may leave too little time for new research
and study. When a case comes out of conference assigned to a particular judge for writing, after majority or even unanimous vote, it is
an incomplete thing; much is left to the judge who has the writing
assignment, and there is a tendency in some courts to let each judge
do his job his own way.259
More generally, the legal realist critique of the common law undercuts
key supporting assumptions about how judges treat precedent and dis-

255. See Orin S. Kerr, How to Read a Legal Opinion: A Guide for New Students, 11(1) GREEN
BAG 2d at 51 (2007). Code proponents argued that "[tihe process of extracting principles from adjudications is a very laborious one, requiring the highest order of mental effort." FOWLER, supra note 170,
at 50.
256.

See generally John Henry Merryman, Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison, 27

STAN. L. REV. 859 (1975) (comparing European civil-law countries to the United States).
257. See generally id.
258. Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations ConcerningJudicial Opinions,61 COLUM. L. REV. 810,
817 (1961).
259. ld. at 818. Even review mechanisms may differ across courts. Leflar notes that when he
joined the Arkansas Supreme Court, the practice was for judges to read their drafts to their colleagues
in conference rather than circulating written drafts. "Complete alertness for three hours of such reading was humanly impossible. Listening judges could do little more than give agreement to blobs of
words, toward the end of the reading time." Id. at 818 n.6.
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putes relied on by nineteenth-century common-law advocates.2 6 More
importantly, to the extent judges, lawyers, and others behave as if this
critique (or the similar critiques offered by Critical Legal Studies and
other left critics of the American legal system)' 6 is correct, the law becomes less accessible as the reasons for decisions become more opaque.
The debate over accessibility suggests another important point in
assessing the efficiency of legal systems: whether parties can contract
around legal rules.1 62 The nineteenth-century debaters did not discuss
this much, perhaps because mandatory legal rules made up a much
smaller proportion of their legal environments than such rules do today
in most developed countries. Inefficient rules matter much less when
they can be contracted around cheaply. This makes up an element of accessibility because the ability to create privately agreed rules governing
the parties' relationship means law making is accessible to the public.
Paul Rubin suggested a single public law making agreements to arbitrate
enforceable would be an important step in "growing" a legal system in a
society where legal resources were scarce. 263 We extend that argument
and posit that making it cheap to contract out of state-provided rules is
an important part of making a legal system efficient.
IV. CONCLUSION

There are six important factors identified from the nineteenthcentury codification debate and our review of the efficiency literature for
legal systems' ability to generate economic growth: (1) the costs of identifying and applying efficient rules, (2) the system's ability to restrain rentseeking in rule formulation and application, (3) the cost of adapting rules
to changing circumstances, (4) the transaction costs to parties needing to
learn the law, (5) the ease of contracting around rules, and (6) the costs
of transitions between systems. We briefly address each.
Much of the efficiency literature focuses on explaining the efficiency
of particular rules produced by the common law. As the nineteenthcentury American debate showed, identifying the relevant rules was a
key concern of lawyers and lay people alike. Both the common law and
the civil law have advantages and disadvantages and the choice between
them is likely to depend on a wide range of details. Even within the two
broad families of legal systems, there are substantial differences that may
be more significant than the category-level distinction. In fact, the original understanding of common- and civil-law legal families referred to the
260.

See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 4-7 (1973).

261. See generally Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779 (1992) (offering perspectives of Critical Legal Studies on what to put in
place of rule of law).
262. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 100, at 281-82 (stressing importance of ability to opt-out of
rules).
263. Rubin, supra note 45, at 4-5.
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rules regulating private law (contract, torts, and property). These rules
are embedded in constitutional and administrative law settings that differ
substantially within common-law and within civil-law jurisdictions.
While these details are difficult to identify at a level necessary for empirical analysis, further investigation could improve the legal origins literature.
Next, both the Posnerian judicial preference version and the evolutionary versions of the efficiency hypothesis contrasted a common law
free of special interests with a version of statute law afflicted with public
choice issues. As the American experience has amply demonstrated, the
common law is not immune to these problems. More importantly, these
analyses reflect a naive view of the constraints present in civil-law systems. French codification prior to the Code Napol6on was resisted by
local Parlements, anxious to preserve their privileges and resistant to creating a national legal system.216 Under such circumstances codification
undoubtedly reduced rent-seeking by forcing more consistency and logic
on a system of local privileges. 265 Once again, details matter in evaluating
efficiency claims. If we step back from the caricatures of both systems
relied on in the literature, we can see that the relevant dimension is the
resistance of a legal system to rent-seeking, not whether it is judge centered or code centered. Moreover, the differences in the extent to which
issues are treated as issues of law and issues of fact vary across systems
and affect the relative importance of rules, the level of certainty, and the
266
cost of resolving the disputes.

264. Tunc, supra note 143, at 21.
265. A Code is "not a mere collection of rules, but a collection of rules with such inner consistency that logical reasoning could be a part of legal reasoning." Tunc, supra note 143, at 30. As Sereni
describes, this affects the scope of discretion for courts as well:
The dogmas of the completeness and self-sufficiency of the written law and of a civil-law system
not only affect the scope and the limits, but also the method of interpretation, of the legal rules on
the part of the courts. An important corollary of these dogmas is that each decision of a court
must find its ultimate justification in some specific provisions of the written law. The broad
statements embodied in the various provisions of the various legislative enactments constitute a
co-ordinated group of major premises from which the solution of each particular legal problem
may be derived by means of a process of deductive reasoning.
Sereni. supra note 9, at 63; see also id. at 65 ("[Nlot only the methods of interpretation resorted to by
the courts in civil-law and in common-law systems are basically different, but also that the relationship
between legal rules and the judicial function is differently understood."). Thus within a code system,
the judicial opinion's "purpose is to compel the court to reach the solution of the case through an independent process of legal reasoning and to offer a legal justification for the result obtained." Id. at
67.
Two important points flow from this difference. First, this constraint can be powerful. Even a
cursory examination of any U.S. state's statutes will reveal what a powerful constraint this would apply
to legislation. In pre-Code France, the "nobles and their property had their own large number of privileged rules; and so did the clergy." Cassin, supra note 205, at 47. A key innovation of the Code Napoleon was "[s]uppression of all the old privileges and equality of all Frenchman, regardless of status,
sex, or social condition." Id. at 49. Second, there is not reason to expect all code systems and all
common-law systems to have the same understandings with the groups of this relationship between
legal rules and judges. Understanding that relationship will therefore be critical to understanding the
efficiency properties of the legal systems in question.
266. Sereni, supra note 9, at 74-75.
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Third, as the multiple equilibria issue suggests, the choice is rarely
of "the" efficient rule over inefficient alternatives. Rather, it is likely
that changing circumstances produce shifts in the relative efficiency of
different rules. The cost of adaptation is thus an important factor in
evaluating a legal system's contribution to economic development.
Again, both families of legal systems have advantages and disadvantages.
The common law adapts slowly but steadily, is vulnerable to finding itself
in blind alleys, and works fastest on the areas causing the most problems
for litigants. The civil law avoids creating inconsistencies through the
need to keep individual provisions of a code in sync with larger principles, allows a range of adaptation through interpretation (although perhaps less of a range than the common law), but may move more slowly to
change. 67 Which set of characteristics maximizes efficiency will vary depending on the pace of change, the type of change, and the qualities of
the decision makers. This is widely recognized in the literature on constitutions, where the American Constitution's longevity is often cited as an
example of the virtue of brief, principles-oriented constitutions. The
French Code Napol6on has survived almost as long and its survival suggests a similar advantage 6 Moreover, within families, legal systems will
vary with their attachment to precedent or the degree to which courts are
allowed to interpret. And too much adaptation risks undermining the
certainty critical to economic activity.
Fourth, as Robert Ellickson shows in Order Without Law,269 legal
systems that do not communicate their rules to those subject to them risk
irrelevance. The cost of learning the relevant rules and of applying them
is related to both the methods by which the legal system organizes its resources and the effort needed to translate them into practical advice.
The advent of Westlaw and LexisNexis reduced the cost of acquiring
precedents in the U.S. legal system (compare to the Cayman Islands legal
system, where court reports are available only in hard copy form) but
may have increased the price of comprehensive advice by increasing the
number of opinions that had to be searched. The development of databases of judicial decisions for code systems likely expands the role of judicial interpretations, at least in practice. Other factors also influence
these costs: a legal system that primarily offers default rules in areas of
private law will be cheaper for participants than one with many mandatory rules. Clearer rules are cheaper, as the unfortunate experience of
the U.S. federal income tax code suggests by negative example.
The ability to contract around a legal system's rules makes it much
less important that the rules themselves be the efficient choices. Neither
267. As one commentator summarized the French system, "The Civil Code combines the reformist with the traditionalist outlook, progress with stability, justice with order. This balancing of countervailing values is no doubt the secret of its success." Friedrich, supra note 70, at 6.
268. Tunc, supra note 143, at 42.
269. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SE'ITLE DISPUTES

(1991).
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system has a clear advantage in this regard, since either judges or legislatures can make particular rules mandatory. There are examples of both
For example, the Code Napol6on prosystems providing for easy exit.
21
contract.
of
freedom
for
vided
Even if a particular system is found to be more efficient, there are
significant transition costs in moving from a code to common law or vice
versa (in particular, adjusting the stock of human capital to a new legal
system is extremely costly and realistically unfeasible in modern economies). These costs may be worth bearing in some instances and not in
others.27 1 For example, French codification led to greater uniformity of
law within France where, prior to the Code Napoleon, Voltaire claimed
that a traveler would have to change laws as frequently as he changed
horses.2 7 2 The nineteenth-century American debate occurred in the context of an effort to replace the common law with a civil code in a number
of jurisdictions. In some of those jurisdictions, new codes were adopted.
A final lesson from the debate is that the transition costs matter a great
deal. The Dakota Territory had few legal resources in 1866; its adoption
of a code system gave it an immediate body of authority, compact
enough for frontier use.273 At the same time, the Dakota Territory lacked
the resources to adapt the code to its circumstances or to maintain it,
leading to the recodification in 1877.274 The massive resistance of the
New York City bar to the proposed New York codes from 1879 to 1889271
undoubtedly reflects the much larger transition costs a change in legal
system would have imposed there.
Developing and maintaining a code requires a significant commitment of legal resources. Maintaining a common-law system, however,
also requires a continual application of resources to ensure the judiciary
is competent and honest. Developing a system of case law reporting that
provides accurate, timely, and locatable precedent is also critical to the
success of a common-law system and expensive. Paying attention to
transaction costs and future operations is crucial to evaluating proposals
270. Cassin, supra note 205, at 49.
271. MATHEWS, supra note 28, at 11 (explaining why western states and territories found codification attractive); ARGUMENTS AGAINST, supra note 26, at 21 (explaining why France, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany codified to unify disparate bodies of law); CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION,
supra note 30, at 60-61 (explaining French and German codification as need for national unity);
CARTER, WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN, supra note 30, at 19 (arguing that because codification would be
"laborious, expensive, and hazardous," benefits would need to be large); Tunc, supra note 143, at 20
(citing need for uniform national law as key reason for French codification).
272. See FOWLER, supra note 170, at 30; see also Cassin, supra note 205, at 46-47 (noting that
"[d]iversity of laws was actually the dominant characteristic of the Ancien Regime. There was such
diversity, first of all, with regard to the sources of the law." Roman law in the south, customary law in
the north: on the eve of the Revolution there were "about sixty general and three hundred local sets of
customary laws"). Similarly, it was claimed that "until 1848 a single commercial bill would sometimes

fall under half-a-dozen rules of law within a comparatively small circuit" among German states.
FOWLER,
273.
274.
275.

supra note 170. at 35.
See supranote 179.
Fisch, supra note 32, at 37-38.
See supra note 28.
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for changes in legal systems. Attention to these elements would provide
a better focus for comparison of legal systems than the formulaic identification of systems as common law or civil law. Both systems represent efforts to solve "the basic problem of retaining the flexibility of a legal system while securing a reasonable amount of certainty with regard to the
solution of legal problems and of predictability for the event of litiga276
tio n . ,

276.

Sereni, supra note 9, at 69.
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